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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3) (2001). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion for 
preliminary injunction? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in refusing of injunction 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City of 
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, f 16, 13 P.3d 581 (citing Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 
972 P.2d 411,412 (Utah 1998)). The reviewing court "considers] whether the trial court 
used sound equitable principles based on all of the facts and circumstances." Id. (citing 
Aquagen, supra, at 412-13). 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
motion for preliminary injunction. (R. 82-96.) The trial court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by Appellees. (R. 589-608.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a dispute over the ownership of real property located in Honeyville, Utah. 
The Appellant, Centro de la Familia de Utah (" CDLF"), is the principal provider of 
Migrant Head Start services in Utah. It is CDLF's contention that Appellee Dream 
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Chaser, L.L.C. ("Dream Chaser"), acting through Appellee Bonita Carter ("Carter"), 
orally agreed to convey title of the old Honeyville Elementary School to CDLF. In return, 
CDLF agreed to refurbish the property and locate a Migrant Head Start Program there. 
Mrs. Carter and her husband, David Carter, paid $72,500 to the Box Elder School 
District to purchase the surplus property. CDLF incurred expenses of more than $680,000 
to improve the property and otherwise bring it into compliance with Head Start Program 
guidelines. Since June 1, 2002, it has operated a migrant Head Start Program at the 
Property, and currently provides services to up to 172 young children of migrant families 
in Northern Utah and Southern Idaho. 
This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court' s denial of CDLF's motion for 
preliminary injunction to stay eviction from the property. The main issue for 
determination is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that CDLF 
cannot demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim 
for breach of oral contract; and, in particular, whether the doctrine of part performance 
places the oral agreement to convey outside the Statute of Frauds. 
The Carters do not dispute that CDLF satisfies three of the four elements of the part 
performance exception (/. e., the improvements made on the property were substantial and 
valuable; valuable consideration was given; and possession was actual and open). They 
do object, however, to the existence of the oral agreement to convey, and the requirement 
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that the substantial improvements to the property were exclusively referable to the oral 
agreement. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
On May 31, 2002, CDLF filed a Complaint against Mrs. Carter, Dream Chaser, 
and The Carter Family Foundation (which at one time purported to own the subject real 
property) (the Appellees are collectively hereinafter referred to as the "Carters") after 
they refused to convey title of the property. The Amended Complaint generally alleges 
ownership of the real property, and seeks specific performance on the breach of contract 
claim. The Amended Complaint also includes claims for quiet title, unjust enrichment and 
fraud. The Carters filed an Answer and Counterclaim, which generally seeks to quiet title 
in Dream Chaser. 
After the exchange of initial pleadings, the parties discussed settlement. In early 
February 2003, the Carters "revoke[d] all prior offers," and twice demanded in writing 
that CDLF "vacate the premises immediately." (R. 279; 361.) To prevent the eviction 
from going forward (the prior two-year lease agreement had expired on October 1, 2002), 
CDLF filed a motion for preliminary injunction to allow it to continue to occupy the 
Honeyville center until the ownership dispute is resolved. The parties agreed that a 
temporary restraining order hearing would not be necessary, and submitted to an 
abbreviated briefing schedule. 
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The parties submitted numerous affidavits in support of their respective positions. 
These affidavits conflicted in fundamental ways. For instance, CDLF's attorney swears 
under oath that the Carters promised to convey the property, and the Carters' attorney 
claims in his affidavit they did not. Although the credibility of witnesses is clearly at 
issue, the trial court did not take live testimony in court, asked no questions of counsel at 
oral argument, and adopted wholesale the Carters one-sided findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
The trial court heard oral argument on March 31, 2003. In a Minute Entry Ruling 
dated April 2, 2003, Judge J. Dennis Frederick denied CDLF's motion for preliminary 
injunction "for the reasons specified in the opposing memoranda and as articulated at oral 
argument." (R. 550.) The Carters submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. CDLF filed objections to those findings and conclusions as not being supported 
by the affidavit evidence. The Carters responded by filing amended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, which the trial court entered without amendment in a Minute Entry 
Ruling dated May 6, 2003. CDLF subsequently filed a timely petition for interlocutory 
appeal, which was granted by this Court by Order dated July 10, 2003. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Appellant and Plaintiff, Centro de la Familia de Utah, is a Utah nonprofit 
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. CDLF 
provides educational and advocacy services to migrant and Hispanic communities 
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throughout Utah, and is the only provider of Migrant and Season Head Start services in 
this state. (R. 156, 1 2.) 
2. Defendant Bonita Carter is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Mrs. Carter is the Trustee of The Carter Family Foundation. She is named as a Defendant 
in this action both in her individual capacity and as Trustee of the Foundation. The 
Foundation is a Utah nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. (R. 13, f 2; 281, 1 1.) 
3. Defendant Dream Chaser, L.L.C. is a Utah limited liability company with 
its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. Dream Chaser purports to own 
fee title of the real property that is the subject matter of this action. (R. 13, f 3.) 
CDLF Seeks a Property in Northern Utah 
4. In 1998, CDLF became aware that its lease at the Intermountain Indian 
School in Brigham City would not be renewed because the property was to be sold to a 
developer. (R. 462, f 2.) Soon after that, in 1999, CDLF secured about $6000,000 of 
federal government grant funding to locate a Head Start Program elsewhere in Northern 
Utah. At the same time, CDLF publicly expressed its interest in establishing a Head Start 
program in Southern Box Elder County or Northern Davis County. With the grant funds 
in hand, CDLF located and took steps designed to purchase a surplus elementary school 
in North Ogden. This effort was dropped after community opposition was voiced. (R. 
467, J 2.) 
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5. Acting through its Regional Site Manager for Northern Utah, Tom Hogan 
("Hogan"), CDLF began scouting other locations. Mr. Hogan heard that the Box Elder 
School District planned to close the Honeyville Elementary School (the "Property") and 
had declared it surplus property. (R. 462, % 3.) In a letter to the Box Elder School 
District dated April 18, 2000, Mr. Hogan expressed CDLF's interest in acquiring the 
Property. (R. 370-1.) In or about April 2000, Mr. Hogan began attending the School 
District Board meetings. If possible, he hoped to convince the School District Board to 
give the Property to CDLF to be used as a Migrant Head Start Program. (R. 462, f 3.) 
CDLF had determined, however, that in the event the School District Board was not 
prepared to give the Property to CDLF, then CDLF would attempt to purchase it for a 
suitable price using a portion of the $600,000 it had on hand, just as it had intended to 
purchase the North Ogden elementary school. (R. 467, f 3.) 
6. CDLF was subsequently informed that the School District Board would not 
donate the Property to it. Bonnie Carter then stepped forward. (R. 462, \ 4.) 
Initial Contacts Between Bonnie Carter and CDLF 
7. In early June 2000, Mrs. Carter contacted Mr. Hogan. She told Mr. Hogan 
that she had read in the newspaper that CDLF wanted to locate a Head Start Program at 
the Property, and that the School District Board had declined to give it to CDLF. She 
also said that she knew the School District Board was considering selling the Property to 
a developer who planned to tear down the building and build homes on the site; had 
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attended Honeyville Elementary School as a child, and did not want to see the school torn 
down and houses built there; and wanted to preserve the building, and see it continue to 
be used as an educational center. (R. 462, f 5.) 
8. Mrs. Carter told Mr. Hogan "we're going to get you this building," or 
words to that affect. Even in this initial contact, Mrs. Carter said her husband had recently 
sold his interest in a software company, and they wanted to acquire the Property to give 
it to CDLF so that they could claim a charitable deduction to reduce their tax burden. (R. 
462, 1 6.) 
9. Mr. Hogan referred Mrs. Carter to CDLF' s CEO, Graciela Italiano-Thomas 
("Thomas"). Mrs. Carter immediately contacted Ms. Thomas, and during this initial 
telephone conversation, Mrs. Carter said: "Since the [Box Elder] School District won't 
give it [the school] to you, I will." (R. 467, 1 4.) 
10. On June 8, 2000, Mrs. Carter met for the first time with Ms. Thomas and 
Robert Leonard, CDLF's Director of Operations, at CDLF's offices in Salt Lake. 
During that meeting, Mrs. Carter repeated her earlier statements to Mr. Hogan that she 
and her husband would like to purchase the Property and give it to CDLF because they 
wanted to claim a charitable tax deduction. (R. 467-8, ft 5-6.) During this meeting, 
Ms. Thomas informed Mrs. Carter that CDLF had at least half a million dollars available 
to make the needed improvements to the Property and otherwise bring it into compliance 
with Head Start Program guidelines. (R. 467, 1 8.) 
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11. Ms. Thomas responded that locating CDLF's Head Start Program at the 
Honeyville Elementary School would satisfy each of Mrs. Carter's state desires that the 
Property should not be torn down, and that it should continue to be used as an educational 
center. She told Mrs. Carter that even though CDLF already had funding to purchase the 
Property, a donation of the Property would free up funding to further improve it and 
provide expanded services. On behalf of CDLF, Ms. Thomas enthusiastically accepted 
Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again to finalize plans to convey the Property. (R. 468, t 
7.) 
12. The next day, Ms. Thomas sent Mrs. Carter a letter thanking her for her 
" generous proposal." "It is by far the largest gift our agency has ever been offered," 
Ms. Thomas wrote. (R. 129; Appendix A hereto.) 
13. Relying on Mrs. Carter's representations that she would purchase the 
Property and convey it, CDLF withdrew any attempt to independently acquire the 
Property. (R. 365, f 15.) 
The Second Meeting with the Carters 
14. In July 2000, Mrs. Carter and her husband, David Carter, met with Ms. 
Thomas and CDLF's attorney, Scott Hansen ("Hansen"), at CDLF's offices, to discuss 
conveyance of the Property. At this meeting, Mr. Carter said he and his wife intended to 
convey the Property to CDLF, but they wanted to push the actual conveyance back until 
after CDLF had used its funds to improve the Property. Mr. Carter explained in detail his 
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intention to convey the Property to CDLF and claim a charitable tax deduction from the 
transfer based not on the amount the Carters had already offered to pay the School District 
in cash (i.e., $30,000), but rather the value of the Property after the anticipated 
improvements were made. (R. 468, f 9.) 
15. Up to that point, Mrs. Carter had said she and her husband intended to 
purchase the Property in August and immediately convey it to CDLF. CDLF decided, 
however, that the Carters' proposal to delay the conveyance presented no obstacle because 
the improvements would take one to one and one-half years to complete, and the Carters 
had made a firm commitment to convey the Property. At the meeting in July 2000, Mr. 
Carter specifically stated that he and his wife would transfer ownership of the Property to 
CDLF, and in return he expected CDLF to expend the substantial funds it had on hand to 
improve the Property. (R. 469, if 10.) 
16. Later in the month of July 2000, Mrs. Carter as well as Ms. Thomas and Mr. 
Hogan together attended a School District Board meeting to consider the Carters' offer 
to purchase the Property for $30,000. After the School District Board withdrew to 
deliberate on the offer in closed session, Ms. Carter told Ms. Thomas and Mr. Hogan that 
she and her husband intended to buy the Property at the lowest cost possible, but claim a 
charitable tax deduction equal to the actual appraised value they would receive by giving 
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the Property to CDLF. She said the Property was worth more than their offer of $30,060 
(R. 463, 17.) 
The Carters Close on the Property 
17. The School District Board rejected the Carters' offer of $30,000. 
Negotiations continued. At a School District Board meeting on September 27, 2000, the 
Board accepted the Carters' offer of $72,500. (R. 365, 11 11-12.) At the meeting, 
Ronald Frandsen, the School District's Administrative Assistant/Business, reported that, 
based on his discussions with Mrs. Carter, the Carters "intended to gift the Property to 
CDLF for use in its Migrant Head Start Program." (R. 365,1 13.) The School District 
Board's Minutes recorded the following: "Mr. And Mrs. David Carter of Salt Lake City 
have offered to purchase the property for a cash price of $72,500. Their intent is to gift 
the property in turn to Centro de la Familia de Utah for use in their program." (R. 381; 
Appendix B hereto.) Mr. Carter spoke at the meeting. Ms. Thomas attended the meeting 
as well and heard nothing from the Carters that led her to believe the deal was anything 
other than what she and the Carters had agreed upon at their second meeting in July 2002. 
(R. 469, 1 11.) The School District Board voted to approve the sale, and the next day 
title was transferred. (R. 366,1 16.) Ms. Thomas attended the closing. (R. 469,1 11.) 
1 
An appraisal that was completed in February March 2002 estimated that the Property was 
valued at $450,000 after the improvements were made. Mr. Hansen's second affidavit refers 
to the appraisal but, through inadvertence, it was not attached thereto. 
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18. A few days later, on September 30, 2000, a Northern Utah newspaper, the 
Standard-Examiner, reported that Mrs. Carter "has promised her school to Centro de la 
Familia, a Hispanic advocacy group, for its migrant Head Start program in southern Box 
Elder County." The article quoted Mrs. Carter as saying: "VI kind of made that dream 
happen,' she said. NHopefully I can help other people's dreams too.'" "The Carters 
and Centro de la Familia are still working out when the building will switch hands, but 
Bonnie Carter said she'd like to see the group in the building as soon as possible." (R. 
117; Appendix C hereto.) Another local newspaper, the Box Elder News Journal, shows 
a picture of Mrs. Carter shaking hands with Mr. Frandsen, and includes a caption which 
states: "The couple paid $72,500 for the 80 year old building and plan on turning the 
property over to Centro de la Familia de Utah to house their Head Start program." ( R. 
118; Appendix D hereto.) 
The Lease Agreement 
19. Before the closing on September 28, Mrs. Carter told Ms. Thomas she would 
like CDLF to sign a lease agreement to cover the period needed to improve the Property. 
(R. 469, 1f 13.) A day after the closing, Ms. Thomas made a report to CDLF's Board 
of Directors concerning the conveyance. The Minutes of that meeting state, in relevant 
part: "Honeyville has been signed and bought by the Carters. We will enter into a rental 
agreement with the Carters. They will donate the monthly rent until they pass title to 
CDLF in a few months." (R. 477; Appendix E hereto.) 
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20. Ms. Thomas was not surprised by Mrs. Carter's request since the Carters 
had already asked to wait until the improvements were completed before conveying the 
Property. It was anticipated that those improvements could take up to one and one-half 
years to complete, and CDLF thought it would be prudent to formalize the parties' 
relationship during this period. (R. 469-70, if 13.) 
21. The lease agreement to rent the Property, and the oral agreement to convey 
title of the Property, were entirely separate agreements. The lease agreement (Appendix 
F hereto) was only designed to cover the period needed to complete the improvements, and 
had a term of only two years. (R. 470, if 14.) 
22. On or about October 5, 2000, the Carters' attorney, Jay Bell ("Bell"), sent 
CDLF's attorney, Mr. Hansen, an e-mail attaching a form lease agreement that Mr. Bell 
said he had used in the past. (R. 324, if 6; 440, if 4; Appendix G hereto.) He and Mr. 
Hansen discussed the duration of the lease, and agreed that two years would provide 
enough time for CDLF to complete the improvements. (R. 440, if 4.) 
23. The form lease agreement makes explicit reference to the consideration given 
by CDLF in exchange for the right to occupy the premises rent-free during the period 
needed to complete the improvements. The page one recital states: "In consideration of 
the covenant to maintain the property which is the subject of this lease, to pay taxes and 
insurance and of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties hereinafter set forth, 
it is agreed as follows:". (R. 290; Appendix F hereto.) 
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24. The "covenant to maintain the property" referenced in the recital is found 
in Paragraph 6 of the lease agreement, which is entitled "Repair and Care of Building by 
Tenant." It contains a clause that states: 
Tenant may at its own cost and expense, and in a good and workmanlike 
manner, make such alterations in the building as Tenant may require for the 
conduct of its business without, however, materially altering the basic 
character of the building or improvements or weakening any structure on the 
Premises. 
An additional clause within Paragraph 6 states: "Any alterations or improvements to the 
Premises shall become the property of the Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination 
of this Lease, except as herein otherwise provided." (R. 291-2; Appendix F hereto.) 
25. Even though the lease agreement underwent at least three different drafts 
before a final version was agreed upon, Paragraph 6 was substantively unchanged from the 
form document that Mr. Bell initially delivered to Mr. Hansen by e-mail. (R. 441, f 6.) 
During the month that it took to finalize the lease agreement, Mr. Bell and Mr. Hansen 
had no substantive discussion about the contents of Paragraph 6. Based on his prior 
experience as a transactional attorney, Mr. Hansen understood Paragraph 6 to contain 
boilerplate language found in most commercial lease agreements. (R. 441, f 7.) 
26. CDLF never intended or agreed that the substantial improvements it made 
to the Property would be referable to Paragraph 6 of the lease agreement. Instead, the 
commitment to make the improvements, and to occupy the premises after the expiration 
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of the two year lease, were strictly referable to the oral agreement to convey. (R. 470, f 
15; 441, 1f9.) 
The Improvements to the Property 
27. Most of the improvements CDLF made to the Property altered both the basic 
character of the building and the prior existing improvements. The Property had been 
operated as an elementary school serving children ages kindergarten through sixth grade. 
The Head Start Program planned for the Property would serve children ages two months 
through five years of age. Further, unlike a public elementary school, the Head Start 
Program provides daycare, health, nutrition and educational programs to the children. (R. 
470, if 16.) Consequently, the Carters purchased the building for only $72,500, but 
CDLF had to expend an additional $680,000 to bring the Property into compliance with 
Head Start Program requirements. 
28. To do so, CDLF's contractor tore down walls, constructed pony walls, 
reconfigured bathrooms and classrooms, installed smaller, age-appropriate playgrounds, 
installed fences, and generally reconfigured the premises from solely an educational center 
for school age children to a social services and educational center for babies, toddlers and 
pre-schoolers. (R. 470, f 17.) 
29. Immediately after the Carters purchased the Property on September 28,2000, 
CDLF began the process of altering and improving the Property to locate a Head Start 
Program there. On October 16, 2000, Ms. Thomas issued "Request for Proposal for 
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Architect" letters to certain local architects; and on November 8, 2000, she issued 
"Request for Architect Interviews" letters. On or about December 19,2000, Work House 
Architects was retained as architect of the " remodel of the existing building." Work 
House first invoiced CDLF on February 1, 2001. As of March 14, 2001, CDLF had paid 
Work House $13,320 for services rendered. The contractor, Todd Jensen Construction, 
was retained on April 11,2001. CDLF paid the architect $42,000; the flooring contractor 
$49,205.35; and the contractor $586,133.06. In total, CDLF expended $680,590.91 to 
complete the improvements. (R. 470-1, f18-22.) 
30. The architect and construction work took about one and one-half years to 
complete. CDLF began occupying the premises on June 1, 2002. (R. 471, f 23.) 
Subsequent Contacts Between Mrs. Carter and CDLF 
31. After the Carters closed on the Property at the end of September 2000, Ms. 
Thomas made a point of telephoning Mrs. Carter about every four to six weeks. These 
regular contacts continued until the Spring of 2002. During this period, Ms. Thomas kept 
Mrs. Carter informed of the progress of the improvements. At no time during any of these 
conversations did Mrs. Carter ever tell Ms. Thomas that she and her husband did not 
intend to convey title of the Property to CDLF. (R. 471, % 24.) 
32. In May 2001, CDLF's attorney, Mr. Hansen, asked Mrs. Carter's 
attorney, Mr. Bell, to initiate the preparation of the deed to convey the Property to CDLF. 
In reliance on Mr. Bell's statement that Mrs. Carter intended to convey title, and with his 
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agreement, Mr. Hansen assisted CDLF in arranging for an appraisal to be performed by 
an appraiser designated by Bank of Utah, a proposed lender to CDLF. CDLF planned 
to purchase a new administrative center in Salt Lake, and it hoped to use the Property to 
collateralize that purchase. (R. 442, 1 11.) The appraisal was completed in February 
2002, and showed that CDLF's improvements had increased the value of the Property. 
33. In its 2000 Annual Report, CDLF showed a picture of Mr. and Mrs. Carter 
next to the following caption: " Centro de la Familia de Utah would like to express our 
utmost appreciation to David & Bonnie Carter for their exceptional vision and foresight. 
Their very generous donation of the HoneyviUe School in Northern Utah will allow us to 
serve an expanding population of migrant families in the Northern Utah area and 
perpetuates the legacy of a building built to serve the community's educational needs." 
(R. 547; Appendix H hereto.) CDLF sent the Carters a copy of the 2000 Annual Report 
in the Fall of 2001. The Carters never informed CDLF of any objection to the caption's 
statement that the Carters would be giving the Property to CDLF. (R. 471-2, 1 25.) 
34. As the construction of the improvements were concluding in the Spring of 
2002, Ms. Thomas contacted Mrs. Carter. During this telephone conversation, Ms. 
Thomas asked Mrs. Carter when CDLF could expect to receive title of the Property. Mrs. 
Carter responded, for the first time ever, that she and her husband had decided not to 
convey the Property to CDLF. She gave as her reason: "We don't agree with your 
mortgaging the building." Ms. Thomas responded fine, we will make no encumbrances 
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a condition of the conveyance, but CDLF wants title. Mrs. Carter then said: "I can't 
give you the south parcel." Ms. Thomas responded fine, the Carters should convey 
whatever they have. Mrs. Carter then referred to her letter of March 23, 2001, and 
replied that the Property belongs to Dream Chaser, and the Carters would only be willing 
to lease the Property in perpetuity. The conversation ended, and Ms. Thomas and Mrs. 
Carter never spoke again. (R. 472, 1 26.) 
The March 23, 2001 Letter 
35. Ms. Thomas received Mrs. Carter's letter of March 23, 2001 (Appendix I 
hereto), but she did not act on it. After consultation with counsel, Ms. Thomas determined 
that it was a unilateral offer to modify the agreement to convey the Property, and CDLF 
would not accept that proposal. The Carters had made a firm commitment to convey the 
Property, and CDLF intended to hold them to that promise. Mrs. Carter never raised the 
letter in any conversation before the Spring of 2002. (R. 472, f 27.) 
36. In March 2002, at the completion of the improvements, CDLF formally 
asked Mrs. Carter to convey the Property. (R. 345-8.) Mrs. Carter refused, stating, 
through her attorney, that she had changed her mind. (R. 442, % 14.) The request was 
repeated a month later in a letter from CDLF's counsel. (R. 351.) 
37. On May 31, 2002, CDLF filed a Verified Complaint generally seeking 
rescission of the agreement to convey, and recovery of the value of the improvements. 
Mrs. Carter and the other Defendants filed an Answer and a Counterclaim generally 
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seeking a declaratory judgment that there is no agreement to convey, and a judgment 
rescinding the letter of March 23, 2001, which offered to continue the Lease Agreement 
in perpetuity. (R. 1-9.) 
38. Soon after that, the parties, through their counsel, began discussing a 
settlement of this dispute. (R. 113, f 15.) 
39. In a letter dated February 12,2003, Mr. Bell stated that all prior offers were 
revoked, and demanded that CDLF "vacate the leased premises immediately." Mr. Bell 
also demanded payment of holdover rent of $5,000 per month, beginning in October 1, 
2002, when the lease agreement expired. (R. 361.) A second written demand that CDLF 
"vacate the premises immediately" was delivered two weeks later.2 (R. 279.) 
2
 The Carters have not, to date, taken steps to evict CDLF from the premises or 
collect holdover rent. At the same time, though, the Carter have been unwilling to enter 
into any formal agreement that would allow to CDLF to continue to occupy the premises 
during the pendency of the litigation. After the trial court's denial of CDLF's motion 
for preliminary injunction, CDLF's counsel requested that the parties agree to stay the 
status quo, but the Carters, through their counsel, have refused. Accordingly, CDLF is 
subject to eviction at any time since the lease agreement expired on October 1, 2002. 
The fact that the Carters have failed to follow through on their demand that CDLF 
vacate the premises implies an ulterior motive on their part. It appears the eviction 
demand may have been a ploy to force CDLF to effectively try its case without the benefit 
of discovery or deliberation. By forcing CDLF to seek an injunction before the parties had 
even exchanged initial disclosures, the Carters were able to accelerate the ordinary 
progression of a civil case, to the prejudice of CDLF. It was denied, for instance, the 
opportunity to depose the Carters and their transactional attorney, Jay Bell, and to obtain 
copies of tax returns and attorney files. The trial court's refusal to hear live testimony 
certainly compounded this prejudice to CDLF. 
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40. On February 21, 2003, CDLF filed a Motion for Leave to File a First 
Amended Complaint, which requests specific performance of the agreement to convey the 
Property, and otherwise asserts rightful ownership of the same. (R. 471-2.) 
41. On March 6, 2003, CDLF filed a motion for preliminary injunction to stay 
the impending eviction. (R. 82-124.) The parties briefed the matter, and filed competing 
affidavits. The trial court heard oral argument on March 31, 2003. The trial court 
received no live testimony at the hearing, and asked no questions of counsel. (Hearing 
transcript attached hereto as Appendix J.) In a Minute Entry Ruling dated April 2, 2003, 
the trial court denied CDLF's motion for preliminary injunction. (R. 550; Appendix K 
hereto.) 
42. The Carters then submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
CDLF objected to the proposed findings and conclusions as not supported by the evidence 
of record. (R. 554-63.) The Carters submitted amended findings and conclusions (R. 591-
608; Appendix L hereto), which the trial court entered without amendment in a Minute 
Entry Ruling dated May 6, 2003 (R. 589; Appendix M hereto). 
43. On May 19,2003, CDLF filed a petition for permission to appeal. By Order 
dated July 10, 2003, this Court granted that petition. (R. 610.) 
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44. Through its Honey ville facility, CDLF presently provides migrant Head Start 
services to up to 130 children3 ages 6 weeks to 5 years. CDLF begins by picking up these 
children from their homes between 7 and 7:30 each morning, and cares for them until late 
afternoon. The children come from between 90 and 100 Hispanic families in the area, 
most of whom are migrant agricultural workers. (R. 156, f 3.) 
45. Eligibility for the Head Start program is based on poverty guidelines. For 
instance, a family of four must earn less than $18,100 per year to qualify for these 
services. CDLF provides the children with day care, early literacy education, art and 
music programs, physical programs, health and dental care, and other age appropriate 
child development services. It also acts as a social and skills center for the parents, who 
typically meet there twice each month to socialize and receive job and other training. (R. 
156, f 4.) 
46. When the motion for preliminary injunction was first filed in March 2003, 
there was, aside from the Honey ville center, one other Head Start facility serving Northern 
Utah and Southern Idaho. The Garland facility was located ten miles from Honey ville, but 
CDLF no longer provides Head Start services there.4 The closest Head Start program in 
3 
This figure represents the number of children served by CDLF at the close of its 
seasonal year on March 1, 2003, when the motion for preliminary injunction was initially 
filed. Since CDLF resumed migrant Head Start Program services on June 1, 2003, 172 
children are enrolled at the Honey ville center. 
4 
CDLF closed its Garland facility on July 31, 2003. Before it was closed, the 
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Utah with any excess capacity is located in Provo, which currently could accommodate 
about 20 additional children. The migrant Head Start programs provide the only 
subsidized bilingual day care in Utah. (R. 156, f 5.) 
47. In the event the Honeyville facility is closed, the families being served from 
there would be forced to either purchase day care, which is unlikely to provide bilingual 
care, or leave their young children in the care of other children while their parents work 
in the fields. (R. 157, f 6.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to issue a preliminary injunction 
to prevent the Carters from evicting CDLF from the premises. Applying a sliding scale 
to the two disputed elements of the Rule 65 A test-L e., irreparable harm and the likelihood 
of success on the merits of the underlying claim-the evidence clearly preponderates in 
favor of CDLF. CDLF makes a strong and uncontroverted showing of irreparable harm 
if the injunction is not issued. It makes an equally strong, although disputed, showing of 
likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim. 
Garland facility served 62 children, all but 20 of who were bused from the Logan area. 
The 42 children previously bused from Logan are served by CDLF's new Head Start 
facility in Logan. When it opened its doors on August 1,2003, the Logan facility operated 
at full capacity of 62 children. The 20 local children previously attending the Garland 
center were transferred to the Honey ville facility, which accounts in part for its recent 
increased enrollment of 172 children. The Honeyville and Logan facilities remain the only 
Head Start Programs in Northern Utah and Southern Idaho. 
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CDLF is likely to succeed on the merits because it can show both the existence of 
an oral agreement to convey, and that the Statute of Frauds does not bar enforcement of 
that agreement. The doctrine of part performance places the oral contract outside the 
Statute of Frauds. It is either not necessary to establish the fourth element of the doctrine 
(i.e., the improvements made on the land must be exclusively referable to the oral 
contract) because there is sufficient evidence independent of the acts of improvement, or 
the facts show that the improvements are exclusively referable to the oral contract. 
Because there is no dispute the Carters refuse to convey title of the Property, CDLF can 
demonstrate a prima facie case of breach of contract. The trial court's refusal to issue 
a preliminary injunction should therefore be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING 
CDLF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
A. Rule 65A(e) Injunction Standards. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e) sets forth the elements required for a 
preliminary injunction to issue: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
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(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or 
enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issues, would not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on 
the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
Hunsaker v. KersK 1999 UT 106, 1 7, 991 P.2d 67 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)). 
B. Marshaling of Evidence 
Ordinarily, to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, 
CDLF, the appellant, would be required to marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thereby making them clearly 
erroneous. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy , 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998). This 
deferential standard is applied because trial courts occupy "an advantaged position to 
evaluate the evidence and determine the facts." Id. 
In this appeal, however, the trial court does not occupy an advantaged position 
because it did not hold an evidentiary hearing before denying the motion for preliminary 
injunction. The trial court's findings of fact are based on the competing affidavits 
submitted by the parties even though there are disputed issues of material fact. 
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For instance, while Ms. Thomas of CDLF asserts in her affidavit there was an 
enforceable agreement to convey title, Mrs. Carter's affidavit denies this. While 
CDLF's attorney, Mr. Hansen, states in his affidavit there was an enforceable agreement 
to convey, the affidavit of Mrs. Carter's attorney, Mr. Bell, denies this. Obviously, the 
existence of the oral agreement is contested, and the credibility of witnesses is at issue. 
It is well established that "a hearing is customarily held and is the preferred 
procedure" to decide a motion for preliminary injunction. 42 Am Jur2d Injunctions § 259 
at 839 (2000 ed.). "The hearing which is required has been characterized as . . . an 
evidentiary hearing. The trial includes a trial of issues of fact, and on the hearing the court 
must give the parties the opportunity to present evidence, . . . " 43 A C.J.S. Injunctions 
§ 225.a (1978 ed.). This is especially so when a dispute exists as to material facts. See 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.21[4] at 65-35 (2003 ed.) (stating a hearing on the 
merits is usually required when a dispute exists between parties as to material facts). 
Because the trial court did not require live testimony before finding the disputed 
facts, and otherwise does not, in relation to this Court, occupy an advantaged position with 
respect to the disputed facts presented by the parties, CDLF should not be required to 
marshal the evidence on appeal. 
C. Undisputed Injunction Elements 
Two of the four elements required for a preliminary injunction to issue were not 
disputed by the Carters in the trial court, and were not discussed by the trial court in its 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law. It should be presumed, therefore, that CDLF 
satisfies these two elements of the four-part test. Briefly: 
1. Injury to CDLF Outweighs Any Damage to The Carters. 
The threatened injury to CDLF posed by the Carters' demand to vacate the 
premises far outweighs whatever damage an injunctive order may cause the Carters. In 
fact, it is difficult to conceive of any damage to the Carters that may be caused by 
preserving the status quo in this case. The fact that the Carters have not yet acted to 
formally evict CDLF proves this point conclusively. 
Pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement, CDLF has never paid rent to use the 
Property. It has, however, paid all expenses to maintain the Property, including payment 
of insurance, taxes and basic repairs. The Carters have never incurred an expense arising 
from CDLF's use of the premises. CDLF intends to continue paying these expenses to 
maintain the premises during the pendency of this litigation. 
2. Injunction Would Not be Adverse to The Public Interest. 
A preliminary injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. On the contrary, 
the public interest is furthered by the issuance of a preliminary injunction in this case since 
some 172 young children of migrant families will continue to receive vital services they 
cannot receive anywhere else in Utah or Southern Idaho. 
D. Disputed Injunction Elements 
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1. CDLF Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if a Preliminary Injunction 
Does Not Issue. 
The purpose of injunctive relief is "preventive in nature. A preliminary injunction 
is "van anticipatory remedy purposed to prevent the perpetration of a threatened wrong 
or to compel the cessation of a continuing one.'" It further serves to "preserve the status 
quo pending the outcome of the case.'" Hunsaker, 991 P.2d at 69 (citations omitted). 
Thus, irreparable harm includes "v[w]rongs of a repeated and continuing character, or 
which occasion damages that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate 
standard. . . . "Irreparable injury" justifying an injunction is that which cannot be ade-
quately compensated in damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in 
money.'" Id. (quoting System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Utah 
1983)). 
"Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction is a demonstration of that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered, . . . " Wright, Miller 
& Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Civil2d: § 2948.1 at 139 (1995 ed.). 
In the event the Honeyville facility is closed, CDLF will be unable to administer the 
Head Start Program that currently serves 172 young children and some 100 migrant 
families. These families cannot obtain comparable child care anywhere else in Utah or 
Southern Idaho. CDLF may also lose credibility with its clients, and in the community. 
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It will also be unable to preserve the substantial improvements it has made to the Property. 
This harm is irreparable and cannot be compensated in money damages. 
The trial court, however, found that CDLF did not make a sufficient showing of 
irreparable harm, rejecting its evidence as being based "on the speculative fear that the 
Migrant Head Start Program could not relocate to another facility and would have to 
close." (R. 606, 1f23.) 
The sole factual basis for the trial court's conclusion that the 172 children currently 
being served by the Honeyville center could be relocated to another facility is Mrs. 
Carter's affidavit, and, in particular, an article in the October 7, 2000 edition of the 
Deseret News she claims to have read and has attached as an exhibit to her affidavit. (R. 
286, f 37.) The article reported that CDLF had closed a Head Start facility in Provo. 
With respect to relocating the children previously served by the Provo facility, the article 
stated: "The Migrant Head Start center in Salem-which is also overseen by Centro de la 
Familia-has accommodated a few children." (R. 308-9.) On the basis of this single 
sentence in a newspaper article written nearly three years ago, concerning conditions in 
Utah County, the trial court rejected CDLF's affidavit evidence detailing its inability to 
relocate the children if eviction is not stayed. 
The trial court's singular reliance on the October 2000 article is so lacking as to 
be against the clear weight of the evidence submitted by CDLF. Its showing of the 
absence in 2003 of alternative facilities in Utah and Southern Idaho is uncontroverted by 
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the Carters, and is hardly "speculative." The evidence is concrete: 172 children will be 
without Head Start services if the Carters' threatened eviction is not stayed, and 58 
employees of the facility (federal and state guidelines impose optimal child-teacher ratios) 
will be without work. The lives of these children, their parents and the staff members will 
be highly disrupted. Further, the improvements CDLF made to the Property will not be 
maintained. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conclude that 
CDLF will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction if not issued. 
2. Substantial Likelihood that CDLF will Prevail on The Merits of 
The Underlying Claim. 
"To meet the requirements of subsection four, an applicant must, at the very least, 
make a prima facie showing that the elements of its underlying claim can be proved." 
Water & Energy Sys. Tec. v. Keil, 1999 UT 16, % 8, 974 P.2d 821 (citing case). In its 
First Amended Complaint, CDLF has alleged four causes of action: breach of the contract 
to convey, quiet title, unjust enrichment and fraud. The motion for preliminary injunction 
is grounded on the claim for breach of oral contract. 
"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, 
and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C, 2001 UT 20, if 14, 20 P.3d 388. 
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Adopting the Carters' arguments, the trial court concluded that CDLF is unlikely 
to prevail on the merits of the underlying claim for specific performance of the oral 
agreement to convey. In particular, the trial court ruled there was no contract to convey 
the Property to CDLF (R. 601, f 5), and if there was an agreement to convey, it is barred 
by the Statute of Frauds ( R. 602, f 8.) 
The Statute of Frauds invoked by the Carters, Section 25-5-1, UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1953), provides that " [n]o estate or interest in real property, . . ., shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or 
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing." 
Because it admits the agreement to convey was not in writing subscribed by Mrs. 
Carter, CDLF relies on the doctrine of part performance to establish the substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying contract claim. The doctrine of part 
performance is codified at Section 25-5-8, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953), and states as follows: 
Right to specific performance not affected.-Nothing in this chapter contained 
shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
See also, Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983) ("Ordinarily a verbal gift of 
land or an oral agreement to convey land is within the statute of frauds. However, the 
29 
doctrine of part performance allows a court of equity to enforce an oral agreement, if it 
has been partially performed."). 
(a) The oral agreement to convey the property to CDLF, 
The terms of an oral agreement to convey title of land "must be clear and definite 
and established by clear and definite testimony." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 
(Utah 1982) {citing Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975)). 
Here, the terms of the agreement to convey were clear and definite: in exchange for 
locating a Migrant Head Start Program at the old Honey ville Elementary School, and 
investing the substantial funds to rehabilitate the Property, CDLF would receive title of the 
Property upon the completion of the improvements. 
(i) Meeting of the minds. 
The Carters asserted in the trial court that "none of the facts relied on by CDLF 
demonstrate that Mrs. Carter ever expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged 
oral contract to convey title to the Property to CDLF. CDLF has no evidence that the 
offer was a firm commitment, as opposed to a mere agreement to agree." (R. 193.) 
"[Contractual mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the 
same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). The parties' intent is measured by objective 
manifestations, and is a question of fact. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 
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1001 (Utah 1991). The relevant inquiry here is the objective meaning of the parties' 
language and conduct.5 
The Carters' argument that there was no contract because there was no meeting of 
the minds defies the objective meaning of Mrs. Carter's acts. 
Mrs. Carters' affidavit, which is the basis for the Carters' opposition to the 
existence of an oral agreement to convey, is an assertion of subjective belief. But her 
alleged belief that she and her husband remained, until March 2001, subjectively undecided 
as to whether they would convey the Property to CDLF, is not controlling. (R. 286, ^ 
39.) Nor is their alleged indecision as to how, on their tax returns, they would treat the 
conveyance to CDLF. These after-the-fact assertions are self-serving, and have the same 
legal force or effect as the professed intent of twenty Bishops. 
Judge Learned Hand's famous "twenty bishops" analogy in Hotchkiss v. 
Nat'I City Bk. Of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), remains the most 
eloquent exposition of this principle that a party is bound by the objective meaning of its 
acts and may not claim a different subjective intent: 
. . . A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or 
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the 
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which 
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were 
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, 
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon 
them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or 
something else of the sort. 
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Instead, only Mrs. Carter's acts are controlling. This point is reflected in the 
description of an offer to make a contract: "the manifestation of willingness to enter into 
a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that 
bargain is invited and will conclude it." Restatement (Second) Contracts § 24 (1981 ed.). 
The affidavits CDLF has submitted show that the Carters' manifestations would 
have led a reasonable person to believe-and certainly led CDLF and numerous newspaper 
reporters and others to believe-that an offer to convey title of the Property to CDLF had 
been made. There is no other explanation for CDLF's expenditure of more than 
$680,000 to improve the Property to locate a Head Start Program there. CDLF did not, 
as the Carters contend, knowingly spend $680,000 to improve the Property for the right 
to occupy it for only four months. (CDLF began folly occupying the premises on June 1, 
2002, and the lease agreement expired on October 1, 2000.) Such a transaction makes no 
sense because that was not the parties' agreement. 
The parties agreed that, in exchange for locating a Migrant Head Start Program at 
the old Honeyville Elementary School, and investing the substantial funds to rehabilitate 
the Property, CDLF would receive title of the Property. Objective, independent evidence 
showing the existence of this contract is ubiquitous. 
When Mrs. Carter first contacted Tom Hogan of CDLF, she voiced her intention 
to purchase the Property and convey it to CDLF. (R. 462, f f 4-6.) In one form or 
another, she repeated this statement in every subsequent conversation she had with Ms. 
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Thomas, and with third parties such as the Box Elder School District Board and newspaper 
reporters. 
The parties' conduct also manifested a mutual understanding that the Carters had 
agreed to convey the Property to CDLF. Mrs. Carter met with Ms. Thomas in June 2000 
to arrange the conveyance; the Carters met with Ms. Thomas and Mr. Hansen in July 2000 
for the same purpose; Mrs. Carter, Ms. Thomas and Mr. Hogan attended a School District 
Board meeting later in July 2000 to consider the Carter's offer to purchase the Property; 
and the Carters actually purchased the Property in late September. Ms. Thomas attended 
the closing on the Property. 
At that point, it was widely reported in local newspapers that the Carters would be 
conveying the Property to CDLF. For instance, the Standard-Examiner reported that 
Mrs. Carter "has promised her school to Centro de la Familia, a Hispanic advocacy 
group, for its migrant Head Start program in southern Box Elder County." (R. 117; 
Appendix C hereto.) "The Carters and Centro de la Familia are still working out when 
the building will switch hands, but Bonnie Carter said she'd like to see the group in the 
building as soon as possible." Another local newspaper, the Box Elder News Journal, 
shows a picture of Mrs. Carter shaking hands with Mr. Frandsen, and includes a caption 
stating: "The couple paid $72,500 for the 80 year old building and plan on turning the 
property over to Centro de la Familia de Utah to house their Head Start program." ( R. 
118; Appendix D hereto.) 
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A few days later, Ms. Thomas reported the terms of the agreement to CDLF's 
Board of Directors. The Minutes of the September 29, 2000 Board meeting state, in 
relevant part: "Honeyville has been signed and bought by the Carters. We will enter into 
a rental agreement with the Carters. They will donate the monthly rent until they pass title 
to CDLF in a few months." (R. 477; Appendix E hereto.) Two weeks later, on October 
16, 2000, and well before the lease agreement was signed in December 2000, the 
construction process began when Ms. Thomas issued "Request for Proposal for Architect" 
letters. (R. 470-1; f 18.) The improvements took about one and one-half years to 
complete. During that period, Ms. Thomas spoke to Mrs. Carter every four to six weeks 
about the progress of the rehabilitation project, and always took pains to thank Mrs. Carter 
for her and her husband's promise to convey. At no time before the completion of the 
improvements in the Spring of 2002 did Mrs. Carter during any of these conversations 
with Ms. Thomas ever say that the conveyance would not occur. (R. 471, 1 24.) 
Additionally, CDLF's 2000 Annual Report was mailed to the Carters in September 
2001 (R. 471-2, if 25) -that is, mid-way through the completion of the improvements, and 
long after the March 2001 letter was sent. Next to a picture of Mr. and Mrs. Carter, the 
caption reads: 
Centro de la Familia de Utah would like to express our utmost appreciation 
to David & Bonnie Carter for their exceptional vision and foresight. Then-
very generous donation of the Honey ville School in Northern Utah will allow 
us to serve an expanding population of migrant families in the Northern Utah 
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area and perpetuates the legacy of a building built to serve the community's 
educational needs. 
(R. 547; Appendix H hereto.) The Carters never objected to this description of their 
commitment to CDLF. (R. 472, f 25.) 
With the knowledge and cooperation of the Carters' attorney, CDLF's attorney 
began in May 2001 to obtain an appraisal of the Property for the purpose of collateralizing 
it after the impending conveyance. (R. 442, f 11.) Mr. Hansen took these steps because 
he and his client understood that CDLF would become the owner of the Property upon the 
completion of the improvements, and they wanted to leverage the equity created by those 
improvements to facilitate the purchase of a new administrative center in Salt Lake City. 
The Carters' attorney was fully informed of CDLF' s efforts to collateralize the Property, 
and he never communicated any objection to CDLF's understanding that it would become 
the owner of the Property. (R. 442, f 12.) 
The foregoing facts are largely undisputed, and provide overwhelming proof of the 
existence of the agreement to convey. The facts show that the parties had a clear and 
definite agreement to convey the Property in exchange for improving it and locating a 
migrant Head Start Program there. Mrs. Carters' statements to third persons, conduct, 
and her and her attorney's silence in the face of CDLF's reliance, altogether show a 
meeting of the minds on the material terms of the agreement to convey. 
(ii) Consideration. 
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The Carters argued in the trial court that there was no enforceable agreement to 
convey because there was no mutual consideration before Mrs. Carter sent the letter of 
March 23,2001. In particular, they argued that until CDLF began constructing the actual, 
physical improvements, it had provided no consideration for the promise to convey. 
(Transcript at 13, Exhibit J hereto.) 
This argument rests on a faulty assumption; namely, it assumes there was no mutual 
consideration binding the executory contract before Mrs. Carter sent her letter of March 
23, 2001. Because it assumes there was no mutual consideration before then, it also 
assumes, again incorrectly, that Mrs. Carters' letter could revoke the promise to convey. 
In addition to verbal and written means, CDLF manifested its acceptance of the 
Carters' offer when it changed its position in June 2000. Relying on Mrs. Carters' 
representations that she would convey title of the Property, CDLF withdrew from 
attempting to purchase the Property. See Restatement (Second) Contracts §71(1981ed.) 
(providing that performance constituting consideration includes forbearance). The Carters 
ultimately purchased the Property for $72,500, which CDLF could easily have paid using 
a portion of the approximately $600,000 it had on hand to locate a suitable property. (R. 
467,1f3.) 
CDLF further changed its position on or about October 16, 2000, when Ms. 
Thomas issued "Request for Proposal for Architect" letters. (R. 470-1, 1 18.) This 
additional change in position occurred before the lease agreement was signed in December 
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2000, (R. 285, f 30), and at about the same time the Carters' attorney delivered his 
initial draft of the lease agreement that was ultimately signed by the parties (R. 324, f 6). 
As of March 14, 2001, CDLF had paid the retained architect $13,320 for services 
rendered in preparing the design plans for the improvements. (R. 471, f 20.) These 
expenses were paid before Mrs. Carter sent her letter of March 23, 2000. 
The fact that on-site construction did not begin until May 2001 is not controlling. 
Indeed, in the trial court the Carters did not cite to any case holding that reliance under 
these circumstances must take the form of on-site work as distinguished from architect or 
other preparatory work. CDLF's change of position is instead controlling. The evidence 
of CDLF's acts, including the expenditure of at least $13,320, before Mrs. Carter's 
letter was sent is uncontroverted. These acts manifested CDLF's acceptance that was 
invited by the Carters' offer. See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 50 (1981 ed.) 
(providing for acceptance by performance). 
Thus, CDLF did not respond to the March 23 letter because an enforceable 
agreement to convey existed well before it was received. CDLF treated the letter as an 
offer to modify the existing agreement. CDLF's silence in response to the letter operated 
as a rejection of the offer to modify. The offer, therefore, never had any legal force or 
effect. See 1 Corbin on Contracts § 72 (1963 ed.). 
To summarize this section, the terms of the agreement to convey were clear and 
definite, and will be established at trial by clear and definite testimony: in exchange for 
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locating a Migrant Head Start Program at the old Honeyville Elementary School, and 
investing the substantial funds to rehabilitate the Property, CDLF would receive title of the 
Property. The ubiquitous, objective evidence showing the terms of the agreement is 
largely undisputed by the Carters, who offer only Mrs. Carters' purported subjective 
belief that she considered entering into an agreement to convey title, but remained 
undecided until March 2001, which she finally decided to offer only a lease in perpetuity. 
(R. 286, f 39.) 
Moreover, there was mutual consideration for the promise to convey. CDLF 
changed its position in June 2000 in reliance on the Carters' representations, and again 
in October 2000. The Carters paid only $72,500 for the surplus property, and CDLF 
could have purchased it as well using the grant funds it had programmed for just that 
purpose. It withdrew from purchasing the Property because the Carters had led CDLF to 
believe that they would instead purchase the Property and convey it. No later than October 
16, 2000, or immediately after the Carters closed on the sale of the Property, CDLF began 
the process of rehabilitating the Property. These improvements were completed in the 
Spring of 2002, at a cost of more than $680,000. Through the rehabilitated Property, 
CDLF began providing Migrant Head Start services on June 1, 2002, thereby performing 
all its obligations under the oral agreement with the Carters. 
(b) The doctrine of part performance. 
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While the Statute of Frauds bars the enforcement of an oral contract to convey an 
interest in land, the doctrine of part performance removes that bar. Ravarino v. Price, 260 
P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 1953). The purpose of the doctrine is the prevention of fraud and 
injustice: 
The doctrine of part performance, in the state of Utah, has not been 
reduced to a formula, as it has in some of our sister states. Thus, decisions 
of this court do not stay the hand of equity in the equitable situations created 
by oral contracts for the transfer of an interest in land, but the statute is 
preserved and remains to serve its purpose-the prevention of fraud and 
injustice. 
Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 56 (Utah 1980) {quoting Holmgren Bros, v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 
611, 613-14 (1975)). It is grounded in principles of equity.See Coleman v. Dillman, 624 
P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981); Hargreaves v. Burton, 206 P. 262, 266 (Utah 1922). 
Four elements are used to measure the sufficiency of the acts of part performance: 
"(1) any improvements made on the property must be substantial and valuable; (2) 
valuable consideration must be given; (3) possession must be actual and open; and (4) the 
acts of performance must be exclusively referable to the contract." Bradshaw v. McBridq 
649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982). 
The improvements made to the Property clearly meet the first element. CDLF 
expended more than $680,000 to bring the Property into compliance with Head Start 
Program requirements. Its contractor tore down walls, constructed pony walls, 
reconfigured bathrooms and classrooms for younger children, installed smaller, age-
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appropriate playgrounds, installed fences, and generally reconfigured the premises from 
solely an educational center for school age children to a social services and educational 
center for babies, toddlers and pre-schoolers. (R. 470, % 17.) 
These were not improvements that would have been made by a tenant in the 
ordinary use of the premises, but were instead substantial and permanently valuable to the 
land. (The March 2002 appraisal found that with the improvements the Property had an 
appraised value of about $375,000 over the $72,500 the Carters paid to purchase it.) They 
also far exceeded the (inflated) free rent amount the lease agreement allowed the Carters 
to claim as a charitable tax donation. Over the term of the lease agreement, that amount 
of $5,000 per month aggregated to a total of $120,000, as distinguished from the more 
than $680,000 that CDLF expended. (R. 471, H 22.) See Ryan, 618 P.2d at 56 (enforcing 
oral contract for sale of land, and identifying as significant the fact that improvements on 
property far exceeded rental value and that needed for ordinary use by tenant). 
With respect to the second element of the test, CDLF has shown that it gave 
valuable consideration to the Carters; namely, it gave forbearance from purchasing the 
Property itself, and agreed to rehabilitate the old Honey ville Elementary School, which 
Mrs. Carter had attended as a child, to locate a Migrant Head Start Program there, and to 
prevent the destruction of the building. 
Satisfying the third element of the test, CDLF took possession of the Property soon 
after it was purchased by the Carters in September 2000, and began continuously 
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occupying it on June 1, 2002. (R. 471, f 23.) This possession of the Property was open 
and known to the Carters and not without their consent. 
The Carters contend, and the trial court concluded, only that CDLF cannot satisfy 
the fourth element, namely, that the acts of performance (i.e., the improvements worth 
$680,000) were exclusively referable to the oral agreement to convey the Property to 
CDLF. (R. 603, f 12.) They argue that the improvements are instead referable to the 
lease agreement, and, in particular, two clauses within Paragraph 6 of that agreement. 
The Carters' argument fails, however, because the oral agreement to convey is 
established by evidence independent of the acts of part performance; and because, in fact, 
the improvements are not referable to the lease agreement. 
(i) Evidence of the oral agreement to convey 
independent of the improvements. 
The element of exclusive referability is " van evidentiary requirement of equity that 
the facts speak for themselves.'" Martin, 678 P.2d at 278 (quoting "The Doctrine of Part 
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah," 9 Utah Law Review 91, 105 
(1971)). "As a corollary, where either independent acts which prove the contract can be 
found, or an admission of the contract is present, the requirement of exclusive referability 
may be relaxed because the evidentiary concern is assuaged by either the admission or the 
independent acts." Id. See also, In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1954) 
(stating: "[w]here existence of the oral contract is established by . . . evidence 
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independent of the acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts of part 
performance must be exclusively] referable to the oral contract is satisfied.. . ."). 
To be sure, the above discussion showing the existence of the oral agreement to 
convey relies on proof of the improvements, but it also includes substantial evidence 
independent of the acts of improvement. This independent evidence, most of which is 
uncontroverted, establishes the existence of the oral agreement, thereby satisfying the 
requirement of exclusive referability. 
In the first instance, there are the Carters' statements to CDLF, newspaper 
reporters and the Box Elder School District Board of their intent to convey the Property 
to CDLF. In her first contact with a CDLF representative, Mrs. Carter told Mr. Hogan: 
"we're going to get you this building," or words to that affect. (R. 462, f 6.) 
Similarly, in her first meeting with Ms. Thomas, Mrs. Carter said: "Since the [Box Elder] 
School District won't give it [the school] to you, I will." (R. 467, % 4.) During June 
and July of 2000, Ms. Carter told CDLF that she and her husband intended to purchase 
the Property in August and convey it to CDLF. (R. 469, f 10.) 
At the School District Board meeting on September 27, 2000, Mr. Frandsen 
reported that the Carters "intended to gift the Property to CDLF for use in its Migrant 
Head Start Program." (R. 365, 1 13.) The School District Board's Minutes stated: 
"Mr. And Mrs. David Carter of Salt Lake City have offered to purchase the property for 
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a cash price of $72,500. Their intent is to gift the property in turn to Centro de la Familia 
de Utah for use in their program." (R. 381; Appendix B hereto.) 
The Minutes of Ms. Thomas' September 2000 report to CDLF's Board of 
Directors concerning the status of the transaction state: "Honeyville has been signed and 
bought by the Carters. We will enter into a rental agreement with the Carters. They will 
donate the monthly rent until they pass title to CDLF in a few months." (R. 477; 
Appendix E hereto.) 
A few days later, the Standard-Examiner reported that Mrs. Carter "has promised 
her school to Centro de la Familia, a Hispanic advocacy group, for its migrant Head Start 
program in southern Box Elder County." (R. 117; Appendix C hereto.) The Box Elder 
News Journal also reported: "The couple paid $72,500 for the 80 year old building and 
plan on turning the property over to Centro de la Familia de Utah to house their Head Start 
program." (R. 118; Appendix D hereto.) 
CDLF's 2000 Annual Report thanked the Carters for "[t]heir very generous 
donation of the Honeyville School in Northern Utah will allow us to serve an expanding 
population of migrant families in the Northern Utah area and perpetuates the legacy of a 
building built to serve the community's educational needs." (R. 547; Appendix H 
hereto.) The Carters never objected to this description of their commitment. (R. 472,1f 
25.) 
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Finally, in the last conversation between Ms. Thomas and Mrs. Carter, in March 
2002, Ms. Thomas asked Mrs. Carter when CDLF could expect to receive title to the 
Property. Mrs. Carter responded, for the first time ever, that she and her husband had 
decided not to convey the Property to CDLF. Rather than deny the existence of an 
agreement to convey, Mrs. Carter gave as her reason: "We don't agree with your 
mortgaging the building." (R. 472, f 26.) 
The foregoing evidence is independent of the improvements. At a minimum, this 
evidences realxes the exclusive referability requirement, but more likely satisfies it. See 
In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d at 281. 
(ii) The improvements are not referable to the lease 
agreement. 
Turning to an analysis of the lease agreement, CDLF's acts of part performance, 
the improvements, cannot be referable to that agreement because they began before the 
agreement was signed. The first overt step CDLF took to improve the Property was to 
issue "Request for Proposal for Architect" letters on or about October 16, 2000. (R. 470, 
% 18.) Once begun, this undertaking continued until the improvements were completed 
in the Spring of 2002. At about the same time the architect letters were sent, Mr. Bell sent 
Mr. Hansen an initial draft of the lease agreement. (R. 324, if 6.) However, the final 
lease agreement was not signed by Mrs. Carter until December 2000. (R. 285,1 30.) 
44 
The acts of improvement are also not referable to the lease agreement because it had 
a term of only two years (i.e., October 1,2000 to October 1,2002). (R. 290,1 2.) The 
parties, through their attorneys, chose this duration because it was anticipated the 
substantial improvements (including compliance with federal government contracting 
procedures) would take about one to one and one-half years to complete. (R. 131-2, f 
7.) In fact, the improvements were completed, and CDLF began providing Head Start 
Program services at the Honeyville center, on June 1, 2002 (R. 471, f 23); that is, 20 
months after the effective date of the lease agreement. 
Nor does the Carters' contention that the parties memorialized their arrangement 
through the lease agreement make any practical sense. The Carters contend that CDLF 
agreed, through the lease agreement, to expend $680,000 to rehabilitate the Property in 
exchange for the right to occupy the premises for only four months, with the added 
requirement that CDLF agreed to vacate the premises as of October 1, 2002, which is the 
middle of the school year. (Migrant Head Start services are provided in Utah from June 
1 to March 1 of the following year, generally reflecting the farm growing and harvesting 
seasons.) The illogic of such an arrangement implies the parties never intended the 
improvements to be referable to the lease agreement. See Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 
1035, 1039 (Utah 1975) (enforcing oral agreement to convey, and reasoning that "the 
facts of this case would be inconsistent with any other conclusion than that the parties had 
a definite understanding, which equity will specifically enforce."). 
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Further, nowhere does the lease agreement state that the substantial improvements 
are referable to it. The lease agreement makes explicit reference to the consideration given 
by CDLF in exchange for the right to occupy the premises rent-free. That consideration 
does not refer to CDLF's substantial improvements, but rather limited maintenance. The 
page one recital states: "In consideration of the covenant to maintain the property which 
is the subject of this lease, to pay taxes and insurance and of the mutual covenants and 
agreements of the parties hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows:". (R. 290.) 
Certainly it is reasonable to assume that if, as the Carters contend, CDLF had 
promised to expend $680,000 to improve the Property in exchange for a two year lease, 
then this recital would have made some form of reference to that arrangement. 
The "covenant to maintain the property" is found in Paragraph 6, which is entitled 
"Repair and Care of Building by Tenant". Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
(10th ed.) defines the word "repair" as follows: "to restore by replacing a part or putting 
together what is torn or broken." A synonym for care is maintenance, which is defined 
as follows: "the upkeep of property or equipment." Obviously, neither the words 
"repair" nor "care of building "contemplate a material alteration of the premises. Indeed, 
the language used in Paragraph 6 proves this point conclusively. Of the two clauses within 
Paragraph 6 that are relied upon by the Carters, the first states: 
Tenant may at its own cost and expense, and in a good and workmanlike 
manner, make such alterations in the building as Tenant may require for the 
conduct of the business without, however, materially altering the basic 
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character of the building or improvements or weakening any structure of the 
Premises. 
(R. 98-9; Exhibit F hereto.) By its plain terms, this clause only authorized CDLF to make 
non-material alterations in the character of the building or existing improvements. 
Because this clause did not cover material alterations in the character of the building 
or existing improvements, it did not cover the improvements that CDLF made to the 
Property, most or all of which were material alterations. And because this clause did not 
cover the improvements that CDLF made to the Property, those improvements were not 
referable to Paragraph 6. 
CDLF' s improvements of the Property were not designed to maintain the premises, 
but rather to alter the character of the school building and prior existing improvements 
therein. The Carters purchased the building for only $72,500, while CDLF had to expend 
an additional $680,000 to bring the Property into compliance with Head Start Program 
requirements. The Property had been operated as an elementary school serving children 
ages kindergarten through sixth grade. By contrast, the Head Start Program to be located 
at the old Honeyville Elementary School would serve children ages two months through 
five years of age. And unlike a public elementary school, the Head Start Program also 
provides daycare, health and nutrition services, as well as educational programs to the 
children. (R. 156, f 4.) To provide these additional services, CDLF altered the premises 
as described above in Section I.D.2(b), page 40. 
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The Carters also rely on a second clause within Paragraph 6: "Any alterations or 
improvements to the Premises shall become the property of the Landlord at the expiration 
or sooner termination of this Lease, except as herein otherwise provided." This clause 
should not be construed out of context, as the Carters would have it. Rather, this clause 
must be read in conjunction with the other terms and purpose of Paragraph 6. 
Pursuant to Paragraph 6, the lease agreement authorized CDLF to make only non-
material alterations to the premises. Since CDLF' s improvements in fact materially 
altered the premises, those improvements fell outside the coverage of the second clause of 
paragraph 6, and therefore of the lease agreement. The second clause of Paragraph 6 must 
be construed to mean the basic maintenance that is authorized under Paragraph 6 becomes 
the property of the landlord. 
As noted above, the lease agreement makes no explicit reference to CDLF's 
improvements. This is also notable because Paragraph 6 employs the most common sort 
of boilerplate language found in all commercial lease agreements. The Carters' attorney 
delivered an initial draft of the proposed language that he said he had used in the past. (R. 
440, f 4.) The two subject clauses of Paragraph 6 passed straight through to the final 
draft, substantively unchanged. (R. 441, t 6.) The boilerplate language of Paragraph 6, 
therefore, contrasts sharply with the extraordinary transaction proffered by the Carters; 
namely, CDLF agreed to rehabilitate the Property in exchange for the right to occupy it 
for only four months. 
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The Carters' s contention that the improvements are referable to the lease agreement 
cannot, therefore, be squared with its language or the parties' circumstances. The 
language and circumstances show that the lease agreement was signed at the request of the 
Carters as a stop gap measure intended to formalize CDLF's commitment to pay property 
taxes and insurance and to maintain the Property during the completion of the 
improvements, and to enable the Carters to claim a charitable tax deduction of $5,000 per 
month (the rent-free amount provided for in the lease agreement). 
The facts in this case place it squarely within the prior decisions of this Court 
enforcing an oral agreement to convey an interest in land. See Ryan, 618 P.2d 54 (finding 
sufficient improvements of $15,000 to $20,000 to the existing cinderblock building, 
fences, ditches, etc., and expenditure of $80,000 to construct new home on the property); 
Woolsey, 539 P.2d 1035 (increase of plaintiff s monthly payment from $70 to $81, which 
was the mortgage amount, and willingness to pay all of mortgage, found sufficient to 
enforce oral agreement); Hogan v. Swayze, 237 P. 1097 (Utah 1925) (possession and 
improvements of cultivation and clearing of land, repair of log house, barn, blacksmith 
shop and fencing found sufficient); Van Natta v. Hey wood, 195 P. 192 (Utah 1920) 
(service to decedent found sufficient). 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conclude that 
CDLF has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim 
for breach of oral contract. An agreement to convey title of the Property to CDLF existed. 
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Because the significant improvements CDLF made to the Property are not referable to the 
lease agreement, the doctrine of part performance is satisfied, and the Statute of Frauds 
does not bar enforcement of the contract. The Carter's refusal to convey title of the 
Property to CDLF is a breach of that agreement. 
Finally, the interplay between the irreparable harm and likelihood of success prongs 
of the Rule 65A test has been described as a "sliding scale." Wright, Miller & Kane, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil 2d § 2948.1 at 139 (1995 ed.) (citing cases). 
In other words, the greater the showing of probable harm that may result if an injunction 
is refused, the lesser is the showing required of a likelihood of success on the merits of the 
underlying claim. With this principle in mind, CDLF has made a strong and 
uncontroverted showing of irreparable harm, and an equally, although admittedly more 
disputed, showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Applying a sliding scale, any 
question concerning the latter showing is more than compensated by the former showing, 
and when coupled these showings preponderate over the Carters' opposition. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant injunctive relief 
to stay the status quo. 
CONCLUSION 
CDLF respectfully requests that the trial court's denial of the motion for 
preliminary injunction be reversed, and the matter be remanded for further proceedings 
on the merits. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2003. 
BUCKLAND ORTON, LLC 
^ t > - J £ 
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Scott W. Hansen 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CENTRO DE LA FAMILIA DE UTAH 
Westgate Business Center 
320 West 200 South Suite 300-B, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone # (801) 521-4473 Fax # (801) 521-6242 
June 9, 2000 
Bonita Carter 
29 Lone Hollow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Dear Ms, Carter: 
Please allow me to express my sincerest thanks for yesterday's meeting. It was a 
pleasure getting to know you and to hear of your extremely generous proposal. Frankly, 
I am overwhelmed. It is by far the largest gift our agency has ever been offered. Words 
fail me when I think about the long-term blessing this building donation would be to our 
families, the children we serve and community of Honeyville. 
I know there are many details to work out, but I earnestly hope this donation can go 
forward. I look forward to our further meetings and feel free to call me at any time if 
you have questions or concerns. 
Very truly yours, 
Graciela Itahano-Thomas 
Chief Executive Officer 
Strengthening the Hispanic Family by Promoting Seif-Sufficiency 
Supported by Salt Lake County Division of Substance Abuse Services 
TabB 
TENTATIVE MINUTES OF A REGULAR MEETING 
OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Tentative minutes of a Regufar Meeting of the Board of Education, Box Elder County 
School District, held Wednesday evening, September 2Z, 2000 at 6:30 p.m. at the District 
Office. 
Those in attendance at the meeting included Board President Teresa N. Garrett, Board 
Members Jerry W. Buchanan, Thomas E. Purdue, Kelly Nelson, and Student Board Member 
Ashley Vance. Also present were Superintendent Martell Menlove, Administrative Assistants, 
Ronald L. Frandsen, Dr. Jay C. Stuart, and Mary Kay Kirkland, representatives of the Box 
Elder Education Association, district employees, members of the press and interested 
citizens. Vice President Siddoway was excused. 
After the prayer, which was offered by Superintendent Menlove, Ronald Frandsen led 
the audience in the pledge of allegiance to the flag. 
President Garrett acknowledged the artwork provided by the students of Young 
Intermediate School then welcomed those in attendance and conducted the business of the 
meeting. 
Ryan Morley, Box Elder High School Student Body President and Keely Hill, Head 
Cheerleader, were present and invited Board members to attend the Homecoming activities 
that are taking place this week at Box Elder High School. President Garrett thanked them and 
wished them well in their activities. 
ACTJON ITEMS 
2001-2002 School Calendar 
Superintendent Menlove presented a tentative calendar for the 2001-2002 school year. 
This proposed calendar has been circulated among the employees for their comment. No 
negative comments have been received at this time. He noted that the UEA break is in 
September on this calendar rather than October, as in the past. This calendar also covers the 
period of time that the Olympics are being held in Salt Lake City. No accommodation has 
been made for the Olympics in this calendar. 
Member Buchanan moved to adopt the tentative calendar. Member Purdue seconded 
the motion, which passed unanimously. 
President Garrett raised a question about having the District Inservice day during the 
County Fair. Dr. Stuart offered to take this to the Career Ladder Committee. 
Tentative Minutes September 27, 2000 
Sale of Honewille School Property 
Mr. Frandsen reported that the negotiations on the sale of Honeyville School property 
are now finalized. Mr. and Mrs. David Carter of Salt Lake City have offered to purchase the 
property for a cash price of $72,500. Their intent is to gift the property in turn to Centra de la 
Familia de Utah for use in their program. The District will give a Quit Claim Deed for the south 
1.5 acres, which has a clouded title, and a Warranty Deed for the north 1.5 acres, for which 
the District has clear title. 
Member Nelson moved to accept the terms of sale as described and to authorize Mr. 
Frandsen to act as agent for the district and sign the appropriate documents at closing. 
MemfreTBuQTanan^ 
President Garrett thanked Mr. Frandsen for his good work on these negotiations, noting 
that we have come a long way since the*o«My-0ffe*-a*ter public notice was $5;000. Mr. 
Frandsen expressed his appreciation to Member Buchanan for his advise and counsel during 
the negotiations. He also thanked Mrs. Carter for the cordial spirit of the negotiations. 
INFORMATION ITEMS 
Monthly Financial Report 
Mr. Frandsen informed the Board that the Financial Report is in accordance with 
expectations in all respects. It is early in the year and expenditures for supplies are 
proportionately high which is to be expected. 
CONSENT CALENDAR 
Member Buchanan moved to accept the consent items. The motion was seconded by 
Member Purdue and passed on a unanimous vote. The Consent Calendar included the 
following items: 
• Approval of the minutes of the meeting of September 13, 2000. 
• Approval of claims numbered 16191 -16487. 
• Approval for Leave of Absence for Judy Bowcutt and Kresta Burbank. 
CLOSED SESSION 
Superintendent Menlove informed the Board of the need for a Closed Session to 
discuss a personnel matter. At 7: 55 p.m. Member Nelson moved to retire to a Closed 
Session to discuss the character and competence of individuals. Member Buchanan 
seconded the motion and it passed on a unanimous vote. 
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lardfecaminjgtr Salurday.'September 30,2000 
School 
From 1B 
made me sick to see the school 
torn down. Education is really 
important to us." 
David Carter is in the 
software business and serves on 
a Weber ' State University 
National Advisory Council. 
Bonnie Carter said this is the 
biggest bit of philanthropy she 
and her husband have been 
tHrivolved io;:lt>as important to 
fbpth of ?feepa}t^ at >lhe .,1baild.big 
^dntinu^r^:;vlt)enefit ' itie 
commurutyr 
. *jZ"" '- *•*'•<•»."• 
.;-.'ThatV,;the>r&eant or the 
community j n . a ^ a y / ' Carter 
said of the buJIdihg^ 
'. JGraclela .1 tahaiuo-Thornas, 
fchief executive'oificer of Cehtro 
de~la ) arhihaf said her staff, 
board and parents are delighted 
at" the prospect .of obtaining the 
Old SChOOi;-'-;' ;v-. : '!'"*r;' ' . 
\ » v '**** ,. <q.
 f, .,. 
- ""We "are very' appreciative 
that they are considering us Tor 
the; jtffi/' $be said. .'•'" • 
;;,Itaiiano~Thomas •
 t.sa[d the 
building will be used as the jiew 
cfcnter
 % for the Migrant 
HeadstaVt program. Centro de 
la -FamiUa has enough mpriey to 
maintain'^li'e building for the 
.150..children ihey serve 37 
weeks of the year. 
" T h i s b u i l d i n g 
accommodates us being able to 
serve more clients. It's centrally-
located and for our purposes, 
it's a better facility,'' 
•HaUano-Thomas said. 
N o , major changes are 
planned for the building apd llje 
Tremonton migrant Meadstart' 
facility is'expected to stay open 
for now. 
Carter* said what surprised 
her about Centro de la Faniilia 
i$ that they work with more 
than Hispanic families. She said 
$he has been very impressed 
with the organization, which 
reaches children and families. 
The Carters and Ccotro de la 
Familia are iiill working out 
when the building will switch 
hands, but Bonnie Carter said 
she'd like to see ibe group in 
the' building as soon as possible; 
•. "Our big push has been just 
to get a hold of Ihe buijduig 
before someone else could do"* 
somethijug else with it/' . ' 
The Carters closed on the 
sale Thursday.. 
You can reach ivpoher Mcllsa 
Ann ' Wilson, at 025-4233 or 
mamhon@itandard.net. 
ormer student buys Honeyville 
Icling sayed.from.. 





uter. was a Utile girl, she 
3 dre#m she lived in an ele~-
ry;s<&bol. 
The former Honeyville Ele-. 
mentary: student has promised 
her-school to Centro de la Fami-
lia,'a Hispanic, advocacy group, 
.for its migrant Head -Start .pro-
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a^developer r'and/.thelother.; a Re-
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bhuinpl'.Tlie article*gavelihfe.im-s-
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SS^ OOO.io Jba torn down," .Garter, 
said.:, 
'«.- She raced up-lo Honeyville 
ifrom her Sandy home to-attend. 
;lthe\closingsocial, which was.that 
•day. On the way she* called, her. 
husband; and Ihey lamented the, 
school's demise. 
**lt was his. idea to;lell them 
not to sell il^lo.'Ibis guy. Weill 
give^  ihem^t^easi 'double ibat 
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Centro de la Familia de Utah 
Board of Directors 
Meeting Minutes 
Administrative Offices Conference Room 
Friday September, 29,2000 
Board Members Present: Jesse Soriano, Paulette Jacobson, J. Dee Carlson, Denise Moravec and 
Marti Jones. 
Excused: Darline Robles, Linda Oda. 
Absent: None 
Meeting called to order 12:00 p.m. Jesse Soriano, Board President 
Approval of Agenda 
Motion by: Marti Jones 
Seconded by: Paulette Jacobson 
Motion Carried 
Approval of Minutes 
Motion by: Marti Jones 
Seconded by: J. Dee Carlson 
Name correction: Olene Walker 
Motion Carried 
Board President Report: Jesse Soriano, Board President 
• Board President and Vice President's visit to the Provo Center after a phone conversation 
with Alma Espinoza, 
Visit to the Provo Center: Concerns about the physical environment and facilities at the 
Provo Center. The interior of the building is dark, not cheery. There was no vitality or 
energy on the part of staff. The facility and staffing are not conducive to a quality program 
for a child development center. 
Recommendations: The Board President, Jesse Soriano recommends to close the Provo 
Center based on observations and the results from the self-assessment assisted by outside 
consultants, which show concerns about the facility and the staff as well. 
• Discussion about the impact on MHSP families by closing the Provo Center. 
• Parents will be notified in advance to give them time to make the transition. There are other 
Head Starts in the area. 
• Our staff will assist with transition. 
• In November a Community Needs Assessment will be conducted to locate mobile migrants in 
the State. 
Motion to close the Provo Center within one week. 
Motion by: Denise Moravec 
Seconded by: J. Dee Carlson 
Motion Carried 
Motion will be reported at the Policy Council (PC) meeting tomorrow. If agreed by the PC, 
-parents will be notified on Monday. 
Results from the investigation on Management and Parent Issues at the Provo Center, 
Copy of summary shared with board members and discussed. 
Motion to accept report as is written with results of the investigation. 
Discussion on board accepting findings and practices but leaving actions concerning employment 
and Policy Council President to be taken by the Policy Council (PC). 
Changes in wording in item 2. Alma Espinoza: She misrepresented and on item 3: Christina 
Romero will be reassigned. 
Motion by: Denise Moravec 
Seconded by: J. Dee Carlson 
Motion carried after deliberation. 
Results of MHSP Self Assessment Paulette Jacobson, Vice President 
• An in house team was assisted by consultants from Clear Vision Consulting. The instrument 
used was the I-99+. Every one was given specific questions to answer. Documentation was 
reviewed. The results show concerns about the Provo center's facilities and staff. They found 
areas that need improvement. Recommendations were made and have been shared with 
management. 
PC Representative Report Denise Moravec 
• All centers are currently open. 
• A Code of Conduct will be included in the PC Bylaws. 
Chief Executive Report: Graciela Italiano-Thornas, CEO 
Changes to Accounting Manual 
• Recommendations form the self-assessment: Title change from Finance Director to Financial 
Services Manager and there is no longer an accounting manager. In Section F, the Decision of 
unallowable cost paragraph added to F2. There are two additional pages listing unallowable 
costs. F-3 has been revised for the Purchase Order system. PO process explained to the 
board. On August 12 the PC approved changes. 
• Typo on Purchase Order (PO): vendors, not venders. 
Motion to accept changes on Accounting Manual 
Motion by: Paulette Jacobson 
Seconded by: Marti Jones 
Motion Carried 
Dates and Times for Federal Review 
• The Federal Review will take place October 23-27,2000. Copy of the tentative schedule 
shared with the Board. 
• Brief discussion of Federal Review. 
Centro Cfvico Project 
• Board of directors from Centro Civico and Centro de la Famiha will meet on November 2nd. 
Other Business: 
• On September 14, Graciela and Rebecca visited the MHSP centers with Lieutenant Governor, 
Olene Walker and Janet Bennett, staff from Senator Bennett's office. The visit impressed the 
guests. Great public relations, 
• Changes to Employment Requirements: 
A paragraph will be included stating that Head Start parents have hiring preference if they 
meet employment requirements. This simply states in writing what is now current practice. 
Motion by: Marti Jones 
Seconded by: Denise Moravec 
Motion carried 







TfflS LEASE AGREEMENT (the "Lease") is effective this )*&- day of 
October, 2000 (the "Effective Date"), between Dream Chaser, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company ("Landlord"), and Centro de la Familia de Utah, a Utah non-profit corporation 
("Tenant"). 
WITNESSETH: 
In consideration of the covenant to maintain the property which is the subject of 
this Lease, to pay taxes and insurance and of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties 
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Leased Premises. Landlord has and does hereby lease to Tenant, the 
premises described on Exhibit "A", including all appurtenances and improvements located 
thereon, and all of Landlord's rights, if any, in and to the premises described on Exhibit "B" with 
each of said premises being located in Honeyville, Utah (collectively the "Premises") for the 
term and upon the rental, conditions and covenants as the parties herein set forth. Said Premises 
includes improvements thereto. 
2. Term. The term of this Lease shall be two years and shall commence on 
the Effective Date and, unless terminated or extended, shall end on the [ ^ day of October, 
2002. 
3. Rent. As a charitable contribution by the Landlord, Tenant is not required 
to pay any ($0) rent directly to Landlord. Provided, in the event Tenant holds-over after the 
term of this Lease, or after Landlord validly terminates this lease early, as a result of Tenant's 
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breach, then Tenant shall pay to Landlord for such hold-over period at the rate of Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000.00) per month. 
4. Authorized Uses. Tenant shall use the Premises only for lawful purposes. 
Such use shall be subject to restrictions of all applicable state and federal laws, restrictions and 
statutes, as well as local zoning ordinances. 
5. Prohibited Uses. Tenant will not keep, use or sell, or allow to be kept, 
used, sold, deposited or stored in or on the Premises, any article or material which is prohibited 
by law, or which would render any fire or other hazard insurance policies in force with respect to 
the Premises void or voidable. Landlord shall have 60 days after the date hereof to remove any 
such prohibited material that are present as of the date hereof. 
Tenant shall not use the Premises in any manner that will constitute waste, 
nuisance or unreasonable annoyance (including without limitation, the use of loudspeakers or 
sound or light apparatus that can be heard or seen outside the Premises) to occupants of adjacent 
properties. 
Tenant shall not do anything on the Premises that will cause damage to the 
Premises, ordinary wear and tear excepted. 
6. Repair and Care of Building by Tenant. Tenant has inspected the 
Premises and accepts the Premises AS IS and in the condition it is in at the time of the 
commencement of the term of this Lease. Tenant specifically takes subject to the current sewer 
which may become unusable because of potential loss of use of a portion of the Premises. Tenant 
will not commit any waste of the Premise, nor shall it use or permit the use of the Premise in 
violation of any present or future law of the United States or of the State of Utah, or in violation 
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Damage to the Premises caused by the installation or removal of such signs shall be repaired and 
paid for by Tenant. 
8. Glass, Tenant agrees to replace all glass broken ox damaged during the 
term of this Lease, with glass of the same quality as that broken or damaged. 
9. Payment of Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges for water, heat, gas, 
sewer, electricity, telephone and all other utilities or services used on the Premises, including 
deposits. 
10. Payment of Taxes and Other Assessments. Tenant shall use its best efforts 
to obtain an exception from the payment of property taxes based upon Tenant's charitable use of 
the property. To the extent Tenant is unsuccessful in obtain such exemption, Tenant shall timely 
pay the general real property taxes, as well as all other taxes, license fees and charges incidental 
to the conduct of Tenant's business on the Premises during the term of this Lease, including 
taxes on Tenant's personal property situated on the Premises; provided, however, that Tenant 
may contest or dispute any such tax, or the amount thereof, upon providing sufficient surety for 
the payment thereof. Landlord shall timely provide Tenant with all notices of the general real 
property tax on the Premises. Upon request by Landlord, Tenant shall give Landlord proof of 
exemption or of payment of such taxes prior to the due date for payment Taxes for the first 
calendar year of the term of this Lease shall be prorated between the parties as of the date Tenant 
obtains possession of the Premises and taxes for the last year shall be prorated to and including 
the date Tenant quits possession of the Premises. Tenant shall pay all assessments (building 
permits) required as a result of its improvements to the Premises. Special assessments imposed 
by any governmental agency as a result of governmentally required improvements that enhance, 
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or purport to enhance, the value of the Premises shall be paid between Landlord and Tenant on 
such terms as they may then mutually agree after considering the remaining period of Tenant's 
Lease and the useful life of the improvement in question. The reasonable, useful life, for 
example, of curb and gutter shall be twenty (20) years. 
11. Right of Entry by Landlord. Landlord and its authorized agents or 
representatives shall have the right to enter the Premises at all reasonable times during regular 
business hours for any of the following purposes: 
(a) To determine whether the Premises are in good condition and whether 
Tenant is complying with its obligations under this Lease; 
(b) To perform, after reasonable notice to Tenant (unless an emergency, in 
which case no notice shall be required), any necessary maintenance including janitorial 
services and to make any restoration to the Premises or the building and other 
improvements in which the Premises are located that Landlord has the right to perform; 
(c) To serve, post, or keep posted any notices required or allowed under 
the provisions of this Lease; 
(d) To post "for rent" or "for lease" signs during the last sixty (60) days of 
the final non renewed term of this Lease, or during any period while Tenant is in default; 
and 
(e) To show, after reasonable notice to Tenant, the Premise to prospective 
brokers, agents, buyers, tenants, or persons with bona-fide interest in an exchange or 
purchase of the Premise, at any time during the term of this Lease or any extension 
thereof. 
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Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any inconvenience, disturbance, 
loss of business, nuisance, or other damage arising out of Landlord's entry on the Premises as 
provided in this Paragraph (or any persons brought or permitted onto the Premises by Landlord 
or its agents). The above to the contrary notwithstanding, Landlord shall conduct itself during 
such inspections in a reasonable businesslike manner and shall be liable for physical injury or 
damage resulting from the negligence or acts or omissions of Landlord or its authorized 
representatives. Absent an emergency, Landlord shall give forty-eight (48) hours prior notice of 
its entry on the Premises, which notice shall be deemed "reasonable" hereunder. 
12. Assignment and Subletting. Neither this Lease nor any interest herein 
may be assigned by the Tenant voluntarily or involuntarily by operation of law, and neither all 
nor any part of the Premises shall be sublet by the Tenant for a period of longer than 30 days 
without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Landlord may withhold its consent on any 
basis it, may from time to time, determine. In the event Landlord withholds consent to sublet 
the Premises, Landlord shall be obligated to immediately terminate the Lease with Tenant 
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Any such assignment or sublease without Landlord's 
prior permission shall be void and unenforceable and shall constitute a default under this Lease. 
13. Damage, Destruction or Condemnation. Should the Premises (or any 
portions thereof) be damaged or destroyed, Landlord shall, within fifteen (15) days from the date 
of such damage or destruction, either (i) notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to repair 
such damage or destruction, in which event Landlord shall promptly repair the same; or (ii) 
notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to immediately terminate this Lease, in which 
event this Lease shall be so terminated effective as of the date of such damage or destruction. 
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In the event notice of condemnation by any governmental authority of the 
Premises or such part thereof as shall substantially impair the ability of Tenant to conduct its 
business, this Lease and the obligations of the parties hereto shall terminate as of the date of 
occupancy by such governmental authority. All proceeds and awards of condemnation, whether 
received pursuant to agreement between Landlord and any governmental agency or judgment of 
any court, shall be exclusively paid to and owned by Landlord, who shall have the sole right to 
negotiate and conclude a settlement of the condemnation award or to litigate such award, in 
Landlord's sole discretion. 
14. Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold 
harmless the Landlord from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from the Tenant's 
use of the Premises during the term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all claims against the 
Landlord for damages to goods, wares or merchandise or for injury to persons in and upon the 
Premises from any cause whatsoever, except such as might result from the negligence of the 
Landlord to perform its obligations hereunder within a reasonable time after notice in writing by 
the Tenant requiring such performance by the Landlord. 
Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord from any and all 
claims of any kind or nature arising from (i) any use or occupancy of the Premises, by the Tenant 
or an approved sublessee after the Effective Date, (ii) Tenant's performance or failure to perform 
as herein provided, (iii) any negligence of Tenant, or any of its agents, contractors, employees, 
invitees or licensees, and (iv) for all claims arising from violations of environmental and 
hazardous waste statutes (federal, state and local) predicated upon contamination occurring after 
the Effective Date and as a result of Tenant's use or misuse of the Premises. 
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15. Comprehensive Public Liability Insurance. Tenant shall at all times 
during the term hereof keep in effect with a reputable insurance company qualified to do business 
in the state in which the Premises is located, comprehensive public liability insurance in the 
names of and for the benefit of the Tenant and Landlord, as their interests appear, with limits not 
less than: 
Bodily Injury $ 500,000 per person 
$1,000,000 per occurrence 
Property Damage $ 1,000,000 per occurrence 
Such overall insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket coverage 
of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days prior to the expiration 
of any policy. Each original policy or a certified copy thereof, or a satisfactory certificate of the 
insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of payment of premium, shall be deposited with 
Landlord within a reasonable time of Landlord's request. 
16. Fire Insurance. Tenant will cause to be maintained fire insurance on the 
Premises in an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the then insurable value, which 
insurance shall name Landlord as primary insured. Tenant shall pay all premiums on such fire 
insurance on a yearly basis. All such policies shall, to the extent obtainable, provide that any 
loss shall be payable to the Landlord or to the holder of any mortgage, as their respective 
interests may appear, notwithstanding any act or negligence of the Tenant which might otherwise 
result in forfeiture of such insurance. Tenant shall annually give Landlord proof of such 
insurance policy being in place, and the policy shall provide that Landlord shall be given at least 
thirty (30) days prior notice of termination. 
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17. Surrender of Premise. Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up the 
Premise and all of Tenant's improvements and alterations, at the expiration, or sooner 
termination, of this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, or as altered pursuant 
to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and damage by the elements excepted. Prior 
to such termination, Tenant shall remove all signage installed by Tenant, and repair all damages 
caused or incurred as a result of such removal. 
18. Quiet Enjoyment. If Tenant performs and observes all the covenants and 
provisions hereof, the Tenant shall quietly enjoy the Premises, subject, however, to whatever 
rights Landlord has, if any, in that portion of the Premises described on Exhibit "B", hereto 
19. Waiver of Covenants or Conditions. No delay or omission in the exercise 
of any right or remedy of Landlord on any default by Tenant shall impair such a right or remedy 
or be construed as a waiver. No act or conduct of Landlord, including, without limitation, the 
acceptance of the keys to the Premises, shall constitute an acceptance of the surrender of the 
Premises by Tenant before the expiration of the term. Only a notice from Landlord to Tenant 
shall constitute acceptance of the surrender of the Premises and accomplish a termination of the 
Lease. Landlord's consent to or approval of any act by Tenant requiring Landlord's consent or 
approval shall not be deemed to waive or render unnecessary Landlord's consent to or approval 
of any subsequent act by Tenant. Any waiver by Landlord of any default must be in writing and 
shall not be a waiver of any default concerning the same or any other provision of the Lease. 
20. Default. If Tenant shall default in the fulfillment of any of the covenants 
and conditions hereof, Landlord may, at its option, after fifteen (15) days' prior written notice to 
Tenant, make performance for Tenant and for that purpose advance such amounts as may be 
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necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense incurred or sum of money paid by 
Landlord by reason of the failure of Tenant to comply with any covenant, agreement, obligation 
or provisions of this Lease or in defending any action to which Landlord may be subject by 
reason of any such failure or any reason of this Lease, shall be deemed to be additional rent for 
the Premises and shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand. The receipt by Landlord of 
any installment of fixed rent or of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any 
other rent then due. 
If Tenant shall (i) default in fulfillment of any of the covenants or conditions of 
this Lease or (ii) commit a material breach of any other lease or agreement between Landlord 
and/or Tenant (other than the covenants for the payment of rent or other amounts) and any such 
default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after notice, then Landlord may, at its 
option, terminate this Lease by giving Tenant notice of such termination and, thereupon, this 
Lease shall expire as fully and completely as if that day were the date definitely fixed for the 
expiration of the term of this Lease and Tenant shall immediately quit and surrender the 
Premises. If such default cannot be remedied within the period of thirty (30) days by use of 
reasonable diligence, then such additional time shall be granted as may be necessary, provided 
Tenant takes immediate action on receipt of the notice and proceeds diligently to remedy the 
default. 
21. Default in Rent Cross Default Insolvency of Tenant If Tenant shall: (i) 
abandon or vacate the Premises or any part thereof; (ii) admit in writing its inability to pay its 
obligations generally as they become due; or (iii) if the leasehold estate created hereby shall be 
taken on execution or by any process of law and not abated, discharged or redeemed by Tenant 
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within sixty (60) days; then Landlord may continue this Lease in effect by not terminating 
Tenant's right of possession of the Premises, and thereby be entitled to enforce all Landlord's 
rights and remedies under this Lease, including the right to recover the rent specified in this 
Lease as it becomes due under this Lease; or terminate Tenant's right to possession of the 
Premises, thereby terminating this Lease, and bring an action to recover and regain possession of 
the Premises in the manner provided by the laws of unlawful detainer then in effect in the state in 
which the Premises are located, and recover as damages from Tenant any amount necessary to 
compensate Landlord for all damages proximately caused by Tenant's failure to perform its 
obligations under this Lease. Landlord shall, in the event it is appropriate, make a commercially 
reasonable effort to mitigate Tenant's damages by reletting the Premises on behalf of Tenant. 
22. Holding Over. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless 
Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, resulting 
from delay by Tenant in surrendering the Premises in accordance with the provisions of this 
Lease. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises or any part of the Premises after the early 
expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease with the consent of Landlord (which 
shall be presumed if Tenant remains in possession and Landlord does not notify Tenant in 
writing to quit the Premise within fifteen (15) days following expiration of the Term), absent 
some other written agreement between the parties, such occupancy shall be a tenancy from 
month to month (terminable by either party upon fifteen (15) days prior written notice) at a rental 
in the amount provided above, plus all other charges payable under this Lease, and on all of the 
terms of this Lease applicable to a month to month tenancy. If Tenant remains in possession of 
the Premise or any part of the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of 
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this Lease, without the consent of the Landlord, Landlord shall, in addition to any other remedies 
available to it, have, all of the rights and remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-36-1, 
et seq. 
23. Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term, covenant and 
condition herein contained. 
24. Liens. Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for moneys owing-by Tenant 
to remain against the Premises for a period of more than thirty (30) days upon actual notice of the 
existence of such lien. Should any such lien be filed and not released or discharged within that 
time, unless Tenant shall contest the same and provide sufficient surety for the payment thereof, 
the same shall constitute a default under the Lease and Landlord may, at Landlord's option (but 
without any obligation to do so), pay or discharge such lien and may likewise pay and discharge 
any taxes, assessments or other charges against the Premises which Tenant is obligated hereunder 
to pay and which may or might become a lien on said Premises. Tenant agrees to repay any such 
sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor, together with interest at the rate of eighteen 
percent (18%) per annum from the date any such payment is made. 
25. No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for any 
purpose, become a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of Tenant's business or 
otherwise. 
26. Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of this 
Lease by suit or otherwise, whether or not suit is instituted, the prevailing party shall receive its 
costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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27. Severability. If any provision of this Lease or the application of any 
provision of this Lease to any person or circumstance shall to any extent be invalid, the 
remainder of this Lease or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other 
than those as to which such provision is held invalid shall not be affected by such invalidity. 
Each provision of this Lease shall be valid and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law. 
28. No Brokerage Commissions. Landlord and Tenant represent and warrant 
that no claims exist against them for any brokerage commissions or finder's fees in connection 
with this Lease and agree to indemnify, defend and hold the other harmless from and against all 
claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, arising from any such brokerage 
commissions or finder's fees. Landlord warrants that Landlord has not dealt with any broker in 
connection with this Lease. 
29. Rights and Remedies. The rights and remedies of Landlord and Tenant 
shall not be mutually exclusive and the exercise of one or more of the provisions of this Lease 
shall not preclude the exercise of any other provisions. The parties confirm that damages at law 
may be an inadequate remedy for a breach or threatened breach by any party of any of the 
provisions of this Lease. The parties' respective rights and obligations under this Lease shall be 
enforceable by specific performance, injunction or any other equitable remedy. 
30. Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be 
deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing, by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
If to the Landlord at the last known address: 
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Ms. Bonita Carter 
29 Lone Hollow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
If to Tenant at the address of the Premises and 
Ms. Graciela Italiano-Thomas 
Centro de la Familia de Utah 
320 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
With a copy to: 
Mr. Scott W. Hansen 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main Street, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
33. Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements 
contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon the parties 
hereto and upon their respective successors in interest, assigns and legal representatives, except 
as expressly otherwise provided heretofore. 
34. Miscellaneous. The captions to the Paragraphs of this Lease are for 
convenience of reference only and shall not be deemed relevant in resolving questions of 
construction or interpretation under this Lease. Tenant shall set be allowed to record a 
memorandum or notice of this Lease without the prior written consent of Landlord. Each 
provision to be performed by Tenant shall be construed to be both a covenant and a condition. 
This Lease shall be governed by and construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah. This Agreement replaces all prior agreements of the parties hereto as to the rental 
of the Premises by Tenant 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto caused these presents to be executed 
the day and year first above written. 
LANDLORD: 




Centre de lajamilia de Utah 
AT-By: Gracielajftalianb-Thomas 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
(Store 105) 
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (the "Lease") is effective this day of October, 2000 
(the "Effective Date"), between Dream Chaser, LLC, a Utah limited liability company 
("Landlord"), and Centra de la Familia de Utah, a Utah non-profit corporation 
("Tenant"). Each Tenant shall be jointly and severally obligated hereunder. 
WITNESSETH: 
In consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties 
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Leased Premise. Landlord has and does hereby lease to Tenant, 
the premise described on Exhibit "A", including all appurtenances and improvements 
located thereon, and all of Landlord's rights, if any, in and to the premises described on 
Exhibit "B" with each of said premise being located in Honeyville, Utah (collectively the 
"Premises") for the term and upon the rental, conditions and covenants as the parties 
herein set forth. Said premise includes improvements thereto. . . ^ " ^ 
2. Term. The initial term of this lease shall commence upon the , 0 
Effective Date and continue until 60 days after such time as either Landlord or Tenant 
jr 
shall give the other written notice of termination. ^ t ^J - " " * ^ 
3. Rent. As a charitable contribution by the Landlord, Tenant is not ^ 
required to pay any ($0) rent directly to Landlord. Provided, in the event Tenant holds-
over after Landlord terminates this lease, then Tenant shall pay to Landlord for such 
hold-over period at the rate of $8,000.00 per month. 
4. Authorized Uses. Tenant shall use the Premise only for lawful 
purposes. Such use shall be subject to restrictions of all applicable state and federal 
laws, restrictions and statutes, as well as local zoning ordinances. 
5. Prohibited Uses. Tenant will not keep, use or sell, or allow to be 
kept, used, sold, deposited or stored in or on the Premise, any article or material which 
is prohibited by law, which is an environmental hazard, or which would render any fire 
or other hazard insurance policies in force with respect to the Premise void or voidable. 
Landlord shall have 60 days after the date hereof to remove any such prohibited 
material that are present as of the date hereof. 
Tenant shall not use the Premise in any manner that will constitute waste, 
nuisance or unreasonable annoyance (including without limitation, the use of 
loudspeakers or sound or light apparatus that can be heard or seen outside the 
Premise) to occupants of adjacent properties. 
Tenant shall not do anything on the Premise that will cause damage to 
the Premise, ordinary wear and tear excepted. 
6. Repair and Care of Building by Tenant. Tenant has inspected the 
Premise and accepts the Premise AS IS and in the condition it is in at the time of the 
commencement of the term of this Lease. Tenant specifically takes subject to the 
current sewer which may become unusable because of potential loss of use of a 
portion of the Premises. TeBaaUflfllLDoLnnmmit-any waste of tho Premise, nor shall it 
i ise nr permit thfl i ISP of the Premise in Violatinn nf qpy preprint nr ft it' trr> Hw nf thp ^tstarw*^ 
United States or of the State of Utah, or in violation of any municipal ordinanco or-
regulation applicable thoroto. Tenant may, with the prior written consent of Landlord, 
but at its own cost and expense, in a good and workmanlike manner, make-such 
-p 
alterations in the building as Tenant may require for the conduct of its business without, 
however, materially altering the basic character of the building or improvements or 
weakening any structure on the Premise. Tenant agrees to keep the interior of the 
building and the improvements on the Premise, including those outside the building 
and the parking lot and grounds and yard surfacing in good condition and repair, 
including repairs to the electrical wiring, heating, air conditioning, plumbing systems, 
and parking paving and to clean and paint the interior of the Premise as the same may 
or might be necessary in order to maintain said Premise in a clean, attractive and 
sanitary condition. Tenant shall keep any walkways, parking area and driveways 
reasonably free from ice and snow. Any alterations or improvements to the Premise 
shall become the property of the Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination of this 
Lease, except as herein otherwise provided. 
Other than as provided in the Lease, Tenant shall not at any time prior to 
or during the term hereof, either directly or indirectly, use any contractors in the 
remodeling, repair or maintenance of the Premise or the building thereon. Any 
contractor necessary to perform such work shall be first agreed upon by the Landlord 
and Tenant, with the expense of such contractor's work to be paid by Tenant. 
However, in the event of an emergencvjenant may employ the services of any 
reputable Utah contractor to perform emergency corrective actions. 
Tenant agrees to maintain the roof of the building and the building's . i ^ ^ - * • 
structure in good condition and repair. "^ 
7. Erection and Removal of Signs. During the term of the lease, 
Tenant may replace or add signage to the Premise for the purpose of indicating the 
nature of the business carried on by the Tenant on said Premise; provided, however, 
that such additional signage shall be first approved by Landlord, shall be in conformity 
with all laws and ordinances in the district where the Premise are located. Damage to 
the Premise caused by the installation or removal of such signs shall be repaired and 
paid for by Tenant. 
8. Glass. Tenant agrees to replace all glass broken or damaged 
during the term of this Lease, with glass of the same quality as that broken or 
damaged. 
9. Payment of Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges for water, heat, 
gas, sewer, electricity, telephone and all other utilities or services used on the Premise, 
including deposits. 
10. Payment of Taxes and Other Assessments. Tenant shall use its 
best efforts to obtain an exception from the payment of property taxes based upon 
Tenant's charitable use of the property. Landlord shall timely provide Tenant with all 
notices of the general real property tax on the Premise. To the extent Tenant is 
unsuccessful in obtain such exemption, Tenant shall timely pay the general real 
property taxes, as well as all other taxes, license fees and charges incidental to the 
conduct of Tenant's business on the Premise during the term of this Lease, including 
taxes on Tenant's personal property situated on the Premise; provided, however, that 
Tenant may contest or dispute any such tax, or the amount thereof, upon providing 
sufficient surety for the payment thereof. Upon request by Landlord, Tenant shall give 
Landlord proof of exemption or of payment of such taxes prior to the due date for 
payment. Taxes for the first calendar year of the term of this Lease shall be prorated 
between the parties as of the date Tenant obtains possession of the Premise and taxes 
for the last year shall be prorated to and including the date Tenant quits possession of 
the Premise. Tenant shall pay all assessments (building permits) required as a result 
of its improvements to the Premise. Special assessments imposed by any 
governmental agency as a result of governmentally required improvements that 
enhance, or purport to enhance, the value of the Premise shall be paid between 
Landlord and Tenant on such terms as they may then mutually agree after considering 
the remaining period of Tenant's Lease and the useful life of the improvement in 
question. The reasonable, useful life, for example, of curb and gutter shall be twenty 
(20) years. 
11. Right of Entry bv Landlord. Landlord and its authorized agents or 
representatives shall have the right to enter the Premises at all reasonable times during 
regular business hours for any of the following purposes: 
(a) To determine whether the Premise are in good condition and 
whether Tenant is complying with its obligations under this Lease; 
(b) To perform, after reasonable notice to Tenant (unless an 
emergency, in which case no notice shall be required), any necessary 
maintenance including janitorial services and to make any restoration to the 
Premise or the building and other improvements in which the Premise are 
located that Landlord has the right to perform; 
(c) To serve, post, or keep posted any notices required or allowed 
under the provisions of this Lease; 
(d) To post "for rent" or "for lease" signs during the last sixty (60) 
days of the final non renewed term of this Lease, or during any period while 
Tenant is in default; and 
(e) To show, after reasonable notice to Tenant, the Premise to 
prospective brokers, agents, buyers, tenants, or persons with bona-fide interest 
in an exchange or purchase of the Premise, at any time during the term of this 
Lease or any extension thereof. 
Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any inconvenience, 
disturbance, loss of business, nuisance, or other damage arising out of Landlord's 
entry on the Premise as provided in this Paragraph (or any persons brought or 
permitted onto the Premise by Landlord or its agents). The above to the contrary not 
withstanding, Landlord shall conduct itself during such inspections in a reasonable 
business like manner and shall be liable for physical injury or damage resulting from 
the negligence or acts or omissions of Landlord or its authorized representatives. 
Absent an emergency, Landlord shall give forty-eight (48) hours prior notice of its entry 
on the Premise, which notice shall be deemed "reasonable" hereunder. 
12. Assignment and Subletting. Neither this Lease nor any interest 
herein may be assigned by the Tenant voluntarily or involuntarily by operation of law, 
and neither ail nor any part of the Premise shall be sublet by the Tenant for a period of 
longer than 30 days without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Landlord may 
withhold its consent on any basis it may from time to time determine. Any such 
assignment or sublease without Landlord's prior permission shall be void and 
unenforceable and shall constitute a default under this Lease. 
13. Damage, Destruction or Condemnation. Should the Premise (or 
any portions thereof) be damaged or destroyed , Landlord shall, within fifteen (15) days 
from the date of such damage or destruction, either (i) notify Tenant in writing of 
Landlord's election to repair such damage or destruction, in which event Landlord shall 
promptly repair the same; or (ii) notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to 
immediately terminate this Lease, in which event this Lease shall be so terminated 
effective as of the date of such damage or destruction. 
In the event of condemnation by any governmental authority of the 
Premise or such part thereof as shall substantially impair the ability of Tenant to 
conduct its business, this Lease and the obligations of the parties hereto shall 
terminate as of the date of occupancy by such governmental authority. All proceeds 
and awards of condemnation, whether received pursuant to agreement between 
Landlord and any governmental agency or judgment of any court, shall be exclusively 
paid to and owned by Landlord, who shall have the sole right to negotiate and conclude 
a settlement of the condemnation award or to litigate such award, in Landlord's sole 
discretion. 
14. Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and 
hold harmless the Landlord from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from 
the Tenant's use of the Premise during the term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all 
claims against the Landlord for damages to goods, wares or merchandise or for injury 
to persons in and upon the Premise from any cause whatsoever, except such as might 
result from the negligence of the Landlord to perform its obligations hereunder within a 
reasonable time after notice in writing by the Tenant requiring such performance by the 
Landlord. 
Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord from any and 
all claims of any kind or nature arising from (i) any use or occupancy of the Premise 
after the 
Effective Date, (ii) Tenant's performance or failure to perform as herein provided, (iii) 
any negligence of Tenant, or any of its agents, contractors, employees, invitees or 
licensees, and (iv) for all claims arising from violations of environmental and hazardous 
waste statutes (federal, state and local) predicated upon contamination occurring after 
the Effective Date.. 
15. Comprehensive Public Liability Insurance. Tenant shall at all times 
during the term hereof keep in effect with a reputable insurance company qualified to 
do business in the state in which the Premise is located, comprehensive public liability 
insurance in the names of and for the benefit of the Tenant and Landlord, as their 
interests appear, with limits not less than: 
Bodily Injury $ 500 000 per person 
$1,000,000 per occurrence 
Property Damage $1,000,000 per occurrence 
Such overall insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket 
coverage of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days 
prior to the expiration of any policy. Each original policy or a certified copy thereof, or a 
satisfactory certificate of the insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of payment 
of premium, shall be deposited with Landlord upon Landlord's request. 
16. Fire Insurance. Tenant will cause to be maintained fire insurance 
on the Premise in an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the then insurable 
value, which insurance shall name Landlord as primary insured. Tenant shall pay all 
premiums on such fire insurance on a yearly basis. All such policies shall, to the extent 
obtainable, provide that any loss shall be payable to the Landlord or to the holder of 
any mortgage, as their respective interests may appear, notwithstanding any act or 
negligence of the Tenant which might otherwise result in forfeiture of such insurance. 
Tenant shall annually give Landlord proof of such insurance policy being in place, and 
the policy shall provide that Landlord shall be given at least thirty (30) days prior notice 
of termination. 
17. Surrender of Premise. Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up 
the Premise and all of Tenant's improvements and alterations, at the expiration, or 
sooner termination, of this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, or as 
altered pursuant to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and damage by the 
elements excepted. Prior to such termination, Tenant shall remove all signage installed 
by Tenant, and repair all damages caused or incurred as a result of such removal. 
18. Quiet Enjoyment. If and so long as the Tenant pays the rent 
reserved by this Lease and performs and observes all the covenants and provisions 
hereof, the Tenant shall quietly enjoy the Premise, subject however, to the terms of this 
Lease and subject to whatever rights Landlord has, if any, in that portion of the 
Premises described on Exhibit "B" hereto. 
19. Waiver of Covenants or Conditions. No delay or omission in the 
exercise of any right or remedy of Landlord on any default by Tenant shall impair such 
a right or remedy or be construed as a waiver. No act or conduct of Landlord, including, 
without limitation, the acceptance of the keys to the Premise, shall constitute an 
acceptance of the surrender of the Premise by Tenant before the expiration of the term. 
Only a notice from Landlord to Tenant shall constitute acceptance of the surrender of 
the Premise and accomplish a termination of the Lease. Landlord's consent to or 
approval of any act by Tenant requiring Landlord's consent or approval shall not be 
deemed to waive or render unnecessary Landlord's consent to or approval of any 
subsequent act by Tenant. Any waiver by Landlord of any default must be in writing 
and shall not be a waiver of any default concerning the same or any other provision of 
the Lease. 
20. Default. If Tenant shall default in the fulfillment of any of the 
covenants and conditions hereof, Landlord may, at its option, after fifteen (15) days' 
prior written notice to Tenant, make performance for Tenant and for that purpose 
advance such amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any 
expense incurred or sum of money paid by Landlord by reason of the failure of Tenant 
to comply with any covenant, agreement, obligation or provisions of this Lease or in 
defending any action to which Landlord may be subject by reason of any such failure or 
any reason of this Lease, shall be deemed to be additional rent for the Premise and 
shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand. The receipt by Landlord of any 
installment of fixed rent or of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any 
other rent then due. 
If Tenant shall (i) default in fulfillment of any of the covenants or 
conditions of this Lease or (ii) commit a material breach of any of any other lease or 
agreement between Landlord and/or Tenant {other than the covenants for the payment 
of rent or other amounts) and any such default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) 
days after notice, then Landlord may, at its option, terminate this Lease by giving 
Tenant notice of such termination and, thereupon, this Lease shall expire as fully and 
completely as if that day were the date definitely fixed for the expiration of the term of 
this Lease and Tenant shall then immediately quit and surrender the Premise. If such 
default cannot be remedied within the period of thirty (30) days by use of reasonable 
diligence, then such additional time shall be granted as may be necessary, provided 
Tenant takes immediate action on receipt of the notice and proceeds diligently to 
remedy the default. 
21. Default in Rent. Cross Default, Insolvency of Tenant. If Tenant 
shall: (i) abandon or vacate the Premise or any part thereof; (iii) admit in writing its 
inability to pay its obligations generally as they become due; or (iv) if the leasehold 
estate created hereby shall be taken on execution or by any process of law and not 
abated, discharged or redeemed by Tenant within sixty (60) days; then Landlord may 
continue this Lease in effect by not terminating Tenant's right of possession of the 
Premise, and thereby be entitled to enforce all Landlord's rights and remedies under 
this Lease, including the right to recover the rent specified in this Lease as it becomes 
due under this Lease; or terminate Tenant's right to possession of the Premise, thereby 
terminating this Lease, and bring an action to recover and regain possession of the 
Premises in the manner provided by the laws of unlawful detainer then in effect in the 
state in which the Premises are located, and recover as damages from Tenant any 
amount necessary to compensate Landlord for all damages proximately caused by 
Tenant's failure to perform its obligations under this Lease. Landlord may, in addition 
to any other remedy provided for by law or permitted herein, at its option, relet the 
Premise on behalf of the Tenant. 
22. Holding Over. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless 
Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, 
resulting from delay by Tenant in surrendering the Premise in accordance with the 
provisions of this Lease. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premise or any part of 
the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease with the 
consent of Landlord (which shall be presumed if Tenant remains in possession and 
Landlord does not notify Tenant in writing to quit the Premise within fifteen (15) days 
following expiration of the Term), absent some other written agreement between the 
parties, such occupancy shall be a tenancy from month to month (terminable by either 
party upon fifteen (15) days prior written notice) at a rental in the amount provided 
above, plus all other charges payable under this Lease, and on all of the terms of this 
Lease applicable to a month to month tenancy. If Tenant remains in possession of the 
Premise or any part of the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner 
termination of this Lease without the consent of the Landlord, Landlord shall, in 
addition to any other remedies available to it, have all of the rights and remedies set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-36-1, et seq. 
23. Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term, 
covenant and condition herein contained. 
24. Liens. Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for moneys owing by 
Tenant to remain against the Premise for a period of more than thirty (30) days. Should 
any such lien be filed and not released or discharged within that time, unless Tenant 
shall contest the same and provide sufficient surety for the payment thereof, the same 
shall constitute a default under the Lease and Landlord may, at Landlord's option (but 
without any obligation to do so), pay or discharge such lien and may likewise pay and 
discharge any taxes, assessments or other charges against the Premise which Tenant 
is obligated hereunder to pay and which may or might become a lien on said Premise. 
Tenant agrees to repay any such sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor, 
together with interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date 
any such payment is made. 
25. No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for 
any purpose, become a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of Tenant's 
business or otherwise. 
26. Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of 
this Lease by suit or otherwise, whether or not suit is instituted, the prevailing party 
shall receive its costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
27. Severability. If any provision of this Lease or the application of any 
provision of this Lease to any person or circumstance shall to any extent be invalid, the 
remainder of this Lease or the application of such provision to persons or 
circumstances other than those as to which such provision is held invalid shall not be 
affected by such invalidity. Each provision of this Lease shall be valid and enforceable 
to the fullest extent permitted by law. 
28. No Brokerage Commissions. Landlord and Tenant represent and 
warrant that no claims exist against them for any brokerage commissions or finder's 
fees in connection with this Lease and agree to indemnify, defend and hold the other 
harmless from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, 
arising from any such brokerage commissions or finder's fees. Landlord warrants that 
Landlord has not dealt with any broker in connection with this Lease. 
29. Rights and Remedies. The rights and remedies of Landlord and 
Tenant shall not be mutually exclusive and the exercise of one or more of the 
provisions of this Lease shall not preclude the exercise of any other provisions. The 
parties confirm that damages at law may be an inadequate remedy for a breach or 
threatened breach by any party of any of the provisions of this Lease. The parties' 
respective rights and obligations under this Lease shall be enforceable by specific 
performance, injunction or any other equitable remedy. 
30. Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder 
shall be deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing, by United States 
marl, postage prepaid, and addressed as fallows: If to the Landlord at the fast known 
address. 
If to Tenant at the address of the Premises. 
33. Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and 
agreements contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be 
binding upon the parties hereto and upon their respective successors in interest, 
assigns and legal representatives, except as expressly otherwise provided heretofore. 
34. Miscellaneous. The captions to the Paragraphs of this Lease are 
for convenience of reference only and shall not be deemed relevant in resolving 
questions of construction or interpretation under this Lease. Tenant shall not record 
this Lease or a memorandum or notice of this Lease without the prior written consent of 
Landlord. Each provision to be performed by Tenant shall be construed to be both a 
covenant and a condition. This Lease shall be governed by and construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. This Agreement replaces 
all prior agreements of the parties hereto as to the rental of the Premises by Tenant, 
(the remainder of this page is left intentionally blank) 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto caused these presents to be 
executed the day and year first above written. 
LANDLORD: 
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T H E C A R T E R F A M I L Y F O TJ N U A I I v ^ 
March 23,2001 
Graciella Italiano-Thomas 
Centro del la Familia de Utah 
320 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dear Dr. Italiano Thomas: 
Dream Chaser IXC is now owned by The Carter Family Foundation. The lease entered into by Dream 
Chaser LLC and Centro de la FamSa de Utah is still in force for the two-year period specified. At the end of 
the lease, Dream Chaser LLC and/or The Carter Family Foundation intend to renew the lease for a period of 
ten years and for subsequent periods of ten years in perpetuity until such time as the lease is broken by your 
party or the facility is no longer needed. 
The Carter Family Foundation supports your organization's work and is pleased to be able to support your 
project for many years to come. 
Sincerely, 
Bonita Kay Carter 
BKC 
Enclosure 
29 LONE HOLLOW DRIVE • SANDY, UT • 84092 
PHONE: 801-553-7150 • FAX: 801-553-7161 
BQNITCARTFRff lHQTMAfT. COM 
Tab J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




BONITA CARTER, et al, 
Defendant, 
Case No. 020904669 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
March 31, 2003 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: David Burns 
Scott Anderson 
BUCKLAND, ORTON, DARGER, 
HANSEN, WALDO & BARTON 
9 Exchange Place, Ste. 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6686 
For the Respondent: Kevin Anderson 
(No information given) 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1909 SOUTH WASHINGTON AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded March 31, 2003) 
3 THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. This is the time 
4 set for hearing on the application for preliminary injunction 
5 in the matter of Centro El La Familia De Utah vs. Bonita 
6 Carter, et cetera. Counsel, state your appearances for the 
7 record. 
8 MR. BURNS: Your Honor, David Burns, co-counsel with 
9 Scott Hansen for plaintiffs, (inaudible) Utah (inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: Very well. 
11 MR. ANDERSON: Kevin Anderson on behalf of Bonita 
12 Carter (inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. Let me 
14 indicate that I've reviewed the pleadings both in support of 
15 and in opposition to the preliminary injunction application, 
16 and I'll allow you to proceed. Mr. Burns, are you going to 
17 argue this matter? 
18 MR. BURNS: I am, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right, go ahead. 
20 MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I'll certainly endeavor not to 
21 repeat what we've already said in the papers. I think this 
22 case is factually involved. I'm not going to summarize the 
23 facts any more than I think is absolutely necessary. 
24 As we set out in our papers, I think there are really 
25 only two issues for the Court to determine based on the 
~3
~ 
1 response, and that is whether there's a contract and 
2 additionally, whether we qualify for an exception to the 
3 statute of frauds under the prior performance exception. 
4 A quick comment about the standard that applies to 
5 both of those issues. The case law requires that there be a 
6 contract shown by clear and definite terms, which is not to say 
7 we're talking about an ordinary contract in an ordinary 
8 commercial transaction. 
9 What it does mean bringing into play the prior 
10 performance exception that the Court is now sitting in equity, 
11 and the Court — that the exception — this exception, the 
12 prior performance exception to the statute of frauds is 
13 designed to just do that, prevent a fraud — a perpetration of 
14 a fraud. The Court is — will review these facts in that 
15 light. 
16 We think that there's clearly evidence — I should 
17 also add that the cases clearly establish that the number one 
18 issue or the most important factual determinant in this context 
19 is whether there were substantial improvements which 
20 permanently altered the property — the lands to be conveyed. 
21 We think we've presented evidence which clearly establishes 
22 that property that was purchased for $72,500 was permanently 
23 I altered and substantially improved by city (inaudible) 
24 | $680,000 — more than $680,000 in improvements. 



























preliminary injunction. This is occasioned by the lessor's 
(inaudible) demand that CDLF evict — that we vacate the 
premises immediately. 
The parties were in negotiations for quite some time 
after the case was filed, were not able to resolve their 
differences. The request — or the demand that we vacate was 
issued in February. They agreed to not go forward with a 
temporary injunction — have to go to the trouble of a TRO and 
were able to agree that we would just come in on a preliminary 
injunction, hence the reason for our appearance today. 
What we're asking the Court to do is enter a 
preliminary injunction preventing enjoining the defendants, 
Dream Chasers, from evicting CDLF from this premises, and we 
set the reasons out in our papers. 
I'd like to make a comment about the irreparable harm 
element. They raised that as their second — besides the 
substantial likelihood of — potential likelihood of 
(inaudible) they've also made a few comments about irreparable 
harm allegations. I don't think they really presented any 
facts to dispute our presentations that the facility provides 
care to 130 children that are registered there. On a typical 
day the facility has served about 80 to 90 children, and that 
those children would then be without daycare — would be 
without the Headstart services that are provided. They 
essentially — there would be no other facility for them to go 
-5-
1 to. 
2 CDLF provides the only Migrant Headstart program in 
3 the state, so it serves all the migrants — nobody else 
4 provides those services. There's only one other Migrant 
5 Headstart program in northern Utah and it's in Garland, Utah, 
6 which is about 10 miles from Honeyville. They simply have no 
7 space. 
8 I will say that just because of the seasons and the 
9 way that this system operates, CDLF just — the season ended 
10 for these migrant services, but will resume on June 1st. 
11 Essentially this is determined by the migrant season, and when 
12 we reopen our doors — somebody stays in the facility all the 
13 time, but we will reopen our doors on June 1st, certainly this 
14 case may not be over by June 1st, and these children will be 
15 brought back to that facility. 
16 We think that we've made a clear showing of 
17 irreparable harm. There's simply nowhere else for these 
18 children to go in this state. 
19 In my opinion, this case, the motion for preliminary 
20 injunction really turns on the substantial likelihood of 
21 I success upon the merits. We've presented our case. I think 
22 | we've gone the extra mile to try and lay out for the Court the 
23 | stories and events that happened — we've done it in a 
24 | compressed period — the parties have not taken discovery, but 
25 | I think most of this evidence, if we pare out what might have 
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1 been said by the defendants and what might have been said by 
2 the plaintiff, we just look at the objective evidence, that's 
3 probably going to be essentially undisputed, and we think that 
4 objective evidence clearly establishes that there was a promise 
5 to convey. 
6 Now I should add that one of the issues that has 
7 arisen here is whether this was a gift or whether it was a 
8 contract, whether it was enforceable, or when was the 
9 consideration given. 
10 That issue arises because the defendant, Ms. Carter, 
11 sent a letter on March 23rd of 2001 which — I should add that 
12 letter is not by any means a model of clarity. It doesn't say, 
13 "I'm not going to give you this property." It simply says that 
14 the owner of the property, Dream Chasers, has been transferred 
15 to the family foundation and then it made an offer to lease the 
16 property in perpetuity. That was simply something that was not 
17 acted upon by CDLF. 
18 Ms. Carter continues to monitor the progress of the 
19 improvements. They never — there was never any discussion 
20 between CDLF and in particular, Ms. Thomas, the CEO and 
21 Ms. Carter about this letter until a year later. Ms. Carter 
22 never mentioned it in any of the conversations she had with 
23 Ms. Thomas, and they were discussing matters about every four 
24 to six weeks. 
25 Ms. Thomas kept Ms. Carter informed of the progress 
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of improvements. Ms. Carter even said that she was aware of — 
she commented to Ms. Thomas that she was impressed by the 
materials that were being used. We're not sure if she actually 
visited the site herself or if she had one of her family 
members that visited, but this is after the improvements were 
actually begun on the ground. 
Now we've also set out in our papers evidence of proof 
that we certainly changed our position before this letter was 
ever sent. Architects were hired and about $13,000 had already 
been expended by the time this letter went out. 
We think that there was a contract, and that there was 
consideration. There was certain forbearance, there was change 
in position, but in the final analysis this isn't the issue. 
The cases clearly establish — in fact, the Harbras case, which 
deals with this same issue, says explicitly that it was raised 
in that case by the defendant, that the Court was relying upon 
the (inaudible) which had involved a transaction, a parol 
gifted property. 
The defendant in the Harbras case tried to distinguish 
themselves from that prior case, and that was rejected by the 
Utah Supreme Court. It quite explicitly said that there is no 
difference when the Court is sitting in equity and measuring 
matters under the prior performance exception. 
The clear implication here is that the Court is doing 
equity for purpose of the statute of frauds — the exception to 
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1 the statute of frauds is that the Court will essentially act to 
2 prevent a fraud. Whether this was a gift or whether there was 
3 consideration or whether there was an enforceable contractr we 
4 don't think that's an issue. 
5 The only issue is whether there was substantial 
6 improvements that materially altered the premises. That's also 
7 an important issue when it comes to addressing their claim that 
8 the lease agreement is the contract that actually refers to or 
9 concerns the improvements. 
10 We distinguish — we pointed out that that lease 
11 agreement was essentially a form document, and it was passed 
12 right through with no revision on this paragraph six. 
13 It is reasonable to assume that that paragraph would 
14 have had seme changes had it been the paragraph that would 
15 govern $680,000 worth of improvements. I should also point out 
16 that the consideration for the agreement as was cited up front 
17 that we also pointed out, and that recital said that the 
18 consideration for the lease agreement is basic maintenance of 
19 the facility, payment of insurance and payment of property 
20 taxes. It doesn't mention CDLF substantial improvements. It 
21 just mentions basic maintenance. 
22 In fact, when we cite sections of the language in 
23 paragraph six, clearly it's just referring to basic 
24 maintenance. CDLF wasn't basic maintenance, it materially 
25 altered the premises. And again, those cases which look at 
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this issue really may come down on one side of whether the 
prior performance that is found where there is substantial 
improvements that materially altered the premises and that 
prior performance is not allowed when there are no material 
changes in the promises. 
Suffice it to say where the Courts are agreeing with 
the defendant's position, this would cause a great injustice, a 
great inequity. It would be a tremendous windfall to the 
defendant. There was clearly detrimental reliance throughout 
this period. 
We've presented objective evidence, newspaper reports 
quoting Ms. Carter. We have direct representation by the 
Carters. We have minutes — board minutes from the Box Elder 
School District. We have board minutes or a board minute from 
CDLF identifying the transaction. We later have a 2000 annual 
report which was sent well after this March letter. It says, 
"Thank you for the donation." It has the Carters' picture in 
the donor section and sent to the Carters, and the Carters sent 
it right back to say, "Well, no, we changed our mind." They in 
fact — Ms. Carter, even though she was speaking to Ms. Thomas, 
never once said that the transfer of conveyance was not going 
to take place until after the improvements had been completed. 
That was in the spring of 2002. 
So we'll basically just submit — if this doesn't 



























on the merits under the standards governing (inaudible) form of 
exception, then I don't know what would. We've clearly 
performed on (inaudible) objective statements or objective 
conduct to believe that we have an agreement. 
Basically we'll submit it on that basis. We also 
filed a motion before the stipulation. Quite frankly we didn't 
have an opportunity to provide a reply brief, although 
(inaudible) hustling to get this in, to gather the facts 
together to piece this story together so we could present a 
coherent explanation about what happened as we understood it. 
But I think I'm pretty comfortable submitting it on our initial 
brief that was submitted. 
We've attached Mr. Hansen's letter. Basically Counsel 
got together in September. The purpose of that meeting was not 
a discovery planning meeting, as the defendants suggest. It 
was to involve — actually that was my initiation as the 
plaintiffs — I initiated that discussion or that meeting for 
the very — for the singular purpose of trying to resolve this 
case before any of us spent any further money. I also threw 
into the mix and sent over a proposed discovery plan, but the 
purpose of that meeting was let's see if we can settle this. 
Mr. Hansen had followed that meeting up with a 
confirming letter. That letter said that, "You've agreed to 
let us stay in the premises rent free during the pendency of 
this case." That letter was not — there was no response to 
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that letter. 
We think we had an agreement at the meeting. We 
were all acting on behalf of our clients. Mr. Hansen has — 
defendant's Counsel has submitted papers to the effect that 
they didn't receive that letter. I certainly don't question 
Mr. Anderson's integrity by any means, but it is quite 
mysterious to us how that could happen. 
On the letter itself it says — it was sent by 
facsimile and by regular mail. I was in another law firm at 
the time. The copy that's actually attached to our papers is 
the copy that I received at Parson Davies. So I received my 
mail copy as a "cc" on that letter. CDLF received its copy as 
a "cc" on that letter, and I think it's reasonable to assume 
that the main addressees would have received a copy as well. 
We think that would be another basis for the Court to 
simply prevent this eviction from going forward. We don't have 
evidence to disprove that they didn't — or that they did 
receive it, but again, we have some inferences that we think 
are pretty compelling. It's on that basis, your Honor, that 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Burns. 
Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: Maybe I'll start with the last issue 
first. As to perhaps why Counsel did not receive it in the 
mail, the most logical explanation to me is the fact that our 
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1 address is incorrect on the letter. Itrs a letter that we 
2 never did receive. It is an agreement which was never made on 
3 September 3rd. We met. We discussed it. As indicated in 
4 the letter, Mr. Bell and I had differences of opinion, and 
5 Mr. Hansen and Mr. Burns were told we needed to take it to our 
6 clients. 
7 It seems curious that the letter would note a 
8 disagreement between Counsel and then they're asserting that 
9 there was some kind of agreement that was actually reached. We 
10 spoke to the clients after the meeting. I called Mr. Burns the 
11 next day and told him that we were willing to allow them to 
12 stay in as long as we were continuing to negotiate in good 
13 faith, because that wasn't again a negotiation process. 
14 With respect to the merits of the claims here, the 
15 difficulty with the contract issue is the formation of the 
16 contract and what were the terms of the contract. 
17 Even if you look at the evidence that they have 
18 presented, Ms. Italiano Thomas' affidavit makes it clear that 
19 there was a significant change in the agreement at virtually 
20 the last minute when she states in her affidavit that the 
21 agreement changed from, "You're going to get titles in August," 
22 to, "There's going to be a two year lease." 
23 There are two significant parts to the timing of these 
24 promises. I believe virtually every statement that they have 
25 as to the nature of this contract occurred before the Carters 
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1 had title. So it is nothing but an agreement to perhaps agree 
2 in the future if and when the Carters ever did acquire title. 
3 Title was not acquired until September 28th of 2000. 
4 All of the statements that they're relying on all 
5~ predate that. It's a-classic agreement to-agree". It's a 
6 classic statement of a future intent to do something. Those 
7 are not enforceable in a court of equity or in the Court's law, 
8 The other significant aspect of the timing issue 
9 relates to the consideration. There was absolutely no work 
10 done to improve the property until several months after they 
11 received a letter dated March 23rd of 2001. They may have paid 
12 architects. We haven't done any discovery. The fact that some 
13 of their documents are numbered doesn't mean that we've 
14 received them, other than what we've got. I didn't actually 
15 get them until Saturday because they came after I left the 
16 office Friday. 
17 Payments to the architect do not directly benefit 
18 the property. They do not fall within the part performance 
19 standard set out in the Bradshaw and several of the other cases 
20 that both parties have cited and relied on. 
21 The only difficult thing about this for your Honor and 
22 for us is trying to understand what CDLF is up to. The Carters 
23 have, even through the negotiations, which continued after this 
24 lawsuit was filed, have been more than willing to allow the 
25 long-term use of this property. The March 23rd letter was not 
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1 any new offer that was made. That was a statement of what the 
2 Carters intended to do and in fact are willing to do. It's not 
3 until the lawsuit was filed that we learned that CDLF wanted 
4 nothing to do with that. 
5 They have taken- a posture in this-litigation that it's 
6 title or apparent — for apparently nothing, and having taken 
7 that choice, I guess they are going to be left with nothing. 
8 It doesn't seem to me the least bit problematic that they would 
9 put $600,000, more or less — we've received three different 
10 figures in the course of this litigation — that they would put 
11 that money into the property on the strength of the March 23rd 
12 letter. I don't see any difference from their point of view as 
13 to the significant investment in a property that they were 
14 going to be able to lease, even for one ten-year period to 
15 justify the costs that they had put into it. 
16 The improvements were not something that was bargained 
17 for by the Carters. The Carters didn't say, you know, "You 
18 need to improve this to bring it up to the Headstart 
19 performance standards," the Carters didn't care about that. 
20 That was something that CDLF did for CDLF's own benefit. 
21 Again, it is consideration — or it is performance that is not 
22 referable to the contract — this supposed oral contract of 
23 sale. 
24 Your Honor, for them to — I think it's fairly classic 
25 circumstance, many of the cases involved property where even 
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more significant work was actually done on the property, the 
erection of buildings, the erection of fences, in some of the 
early cases, and the Court simply said, "That's not enough 
because those acts were benefitting the user of the property 
-lor his-use of the property." It- didn'-t necessarily benefit 
the owner, and they were not acts that were done in 
consideration of an agreement to get title. They were acts 
that were done for CDLF's benefit for CDLF to utilize the 
property. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Anderson, thank you. 
Mr. Burns, this being your application, I'll grant you a very 
limited opportunity to respond, if you wish to do so. 
MR. BURNS: I can just submit it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I believe that the respective 
briefs detail the circumstances sufficiently for me to rule; 
however, I'm going to take the motion under advisement. I will 
notify you shortly of my decision by minute entry ruling. 
Thank you. We'll be in recess. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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LAW AND ORDER 
Civil No. 020904669 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Court, having entered a Minute Entry Ruling on April 2,2003, now adopts and enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Centra de la Familia de Utah ("CDLF") is a Utah nonprofit corporation 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. CDLF provides educational and 
advocacy services to migrant and Hispanic communities throughout Utah, and is the principal provider 
of migrant Head Start services in this State. 
2. Defendant Bonita K. ("Bonnie") Carter, is an individual residing in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Carter is the Trustee of The Carter Family Foundation (the "Foundation"). The 
Foundation is a Utah nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
3. Defendant Dream Chaser, L.L.C. ("Dream Chaser") is a Utah limited liability 
company with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. In 1998, CDLF became aware that its lease at the Intermountain Indian School in 
Brigham City would not be renewed because the property was to be sold to a developer. Affidavit of 
Thomas Hogan ("Hogan" Aff.") f 2. In 1999, CDLF located and attempted to acquire a surplus 
elementary school in North Ogden. This effort was dropped after community opposition was voiced. 
March 27, 2003 Affidavit of Graciela Italiano-Thomas ("Second Italiano-Thomas Aff.") f 2. 
5. Thomas Hogan, on behalf of CDLF, began scouting other locations. Mr. Hogan 
heard that the Box Elder School District planned to close the Honeyville Elementary School (the 
"Property") and had declared it surplus property. Hogan Aff, f 3. 
6. On September 29,1999, the Board of Education (the "Board") of the Box Elder 
County School District ("School District") voted to declare Honeyville Elementary School property (the 
"Property") as surplus at the end of the school year. Affidavit of Ronald L. Frandsen ("Frandsen Aff.") 
12 and Ex. 1. 
7. Graciela Italiano-Thomas and Mr. Hogan, attended an April 26, 2000 School 
District Board meeting on behalf of CDLF. They requested that the board donate the Property to CDLF 
for its use as a Migrant Head Start center. Frandsen Aff. f 4 and Ex. 3. 
8. Mr. Frandsen, who regularly attended School District Board meetings during this 
time and was ultimately put in charge of the sale of the Property, never received any inquiry or offer 
from CDLF concerning the purchase of the Property, and never heard that any inquiries or offers to 
purchase had ever been made by CDLF to the School District. Frandsen Aff. fj 1 and 15. See also 
March 6, 2003 Affidavit of Graciela Italiano-Thomas ("First Italiano-Thomas Aff.") f 5 ("it was 
unlikely we would be able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property"). 
9. Initially, the Property was made available to the public through a legal notice and 
sealed bid process. Frandsen Aff. f 5. Only one bid was received from a local developer, Scott 
Mitchell, to purchase the Property for $5,000, which was not responsive to the bid specifications. Id. 
10. The School District Board was unwilling to give the Property to CDLF. First 
Italiano-Thomas Affidavit f 5; Hogan Aff. f 4. The School District was interested in seeking additional 
bids for the Property. Affidavit of Bonita K. Carter ("Carter Aff.") $3. See also Frandsen Aff. f 14. 
11. After reading a May 31, 2000 article in the Salt Lake Tribune entitled: "Honeyville 
Residents Say Goodbye to 81-Year-Old Elementary School", Bonnie Carter became aware that the 
elementary school she had attended as a child was scheduled to be closed and the building sold. She 
also learned that CDLF was interested in using the Property to house its Migrant Head Start program in 
Box Elder County. Carter Aff. f 2. 
12. In early June 2000, Bonnie Carter met with Ms. Italiano-Thomas at CDLF's Salt 
Lake office. During the meeting they discussed of the idea of the Carters acquiring the Property and 
making a donation to CDLF of the use of the Property for its Migrant Head Start program in Box Elder 
County. Carter Aff. <H 4, 7-8; Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. <H 5-7. 
13. During Bonnie Carter's meeting with Ms. Italiano-Thomas an outright donation of 
title to the Property to the CDLF was discussed. Carter Aff. f 7; Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 6. This 
was one of several possibilities discussed during that meeting. Carter Aff. f7 . Bonnie Carter said she 
and her husband intended to purchase the Property in August and immediately convey it to CDLF. 
Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. % 10. While this possibility was discussed, the Carters had not made a 
final decision and there was no commitment made to CDLF that they would do so. Carter Aff. f 7; 
Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 7. 
14. Following this meeting, Ms. Italiano-Thomas sent a letter to Ms, Carter. Carter 
Aff. I l l ; First Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 4 and Ex. A. This letter contains no reference to any promise or 
firm commitment to make an outright donation of title to the Property having been made during the 
meeting. First Italiano-Thomas Aff. Ex. A. The letter merely refers to an undefined "generous 
proposal" and "gift", and acknowledges that there were "many details to work out." Id. Rather than a 
statement that CDLF and Bonnie Carter had entered into binding agreement, Ms. Italiano-Thomas 
states: "I earnestly hope this donation can go forward." First Italiano-Thomas Aff. Ex. A. See also 
Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 7 ("I enthusiastically accepted Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again to 
finalize an agreement to convey the Property."). 
15. Shortly after this meeting, Bonnie Carter began negotiating with Mr. Frandsen of 
the School District concerning the purchase of the Property. Carter Aff. f 12; Frandsen Aff. f 6. 
16. In July 2000, the Carters offered to buy the Property for $30,000, with the closing 
date set in early August 2000. Carter Aff. f 15; Frandsen Aff. 111. 
17. Ms. Italiano-Thomas refers to another meeting in July 2000 at which the donation 
of the Property to CDLF was discussed. At that meeting, the Carters discussed postponing the actual 
conveyance of the Property to CDLF until after CDLF had used its funds to improve the Property in 
order to claim a charitable tax deduction based on the value of the Property after the anticipated 
improvements had been made. Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 9. 
18. The School District wanted more money for the Property and Bonnie Carter and 
Mr. Frandsen continued to negotiate. Carter Aff. f 16; Frandsen Aff. 511. 
19. Bonnie Carter investigated the possibility of obtaining marketable title to a 
southern parcel owned by Elzarus Hunsaker (the "South Parcel"), but used by the Honeyville 
Elementary School pursuant to a verbal arrangement as a septic system drainage field, among other 
things. Carter Aff. ff 13-14, 17-18; Frandsen Aff. If 7-8 and Ex. 5. This effort was ultimately 
unsuccessful, but delayed the closing to the end of September 2000. Carter Aff. f 18. 
20. The Carters and Mr. Frandsen eventually agreed that the School District Board 
would sell the Property to Dream Chaser, an entity formed by the Carters specifically to own and 
manage the Property, for $72,500. Carter Aff. ff 1 and 20; Frandsen Aff. 111. 
21. On September 27, 2000, the School District Board met and voted to approve the 
sale of the Property to Dream Chaser for $72,500. Carter Aff. f 21; Frandsen Aff. f 12 and Ex. 6. 
22. To assist with the creation of Dream Chaser, the closing on the Property and the 
preparation of a lease agreement with CDLF, the Carters employed Jay B. Bell and the law firm of 
Fabian & Clendenin. Carter Aff. f 25. 
23. Being unable to obtain marketable title to the South Parcel, the Carters decided to 
lease the Property to CDLF rent free for a two year period, with the idea that they would decide whether 
to make an outright gift of the Property to CDLF by the end of the two year period. Carter Aff. f 23. 
The decision to lease the Property to CDLF rent free for a two year period was communicated to CDLF 
by Bonnie Carter to Ms. Italiano-Thomas sometime before the closing. Carter Aff. f 24; Second 
Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 13. 
24. The sale of the Property to Dream Chaser was concluded on September 28, 2000. 
Carter Aff. f 26; Frandsen Aff. f 16. The School District gave Dream Chaser a Warranty Deed to the 
North Parcel, Frandsen Aff. Ex. 7, and a Quit Claim Deed to the South Parcel. Frandsen Aff. Ex. 8. 
25. None of the statements of intent to convey the Property made by the Carters to 
representatives of CDLF occurred after the Carters, through Dream Chaser, had obtained title to the 
Property. First Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 3 (mid 2000); id. f 4 (June 8, 2000); Second Italiano-Thomas 
Aff. f 4 (early June 2000); id. f 6 (June 8, 2000); id. f 9 (July 2000); id. f 10 (during two prior 
conversations in June 2000); id. f 11 (September 27, 2000); Hogan Aff. f 6 (early June 2000); id. f 1 
(July 2000). 
26. CDLF admits the agreement to convey was not in writing subscribed by Carter. 
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum p. 1. The "memorializations" relied upon by CDLF, Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support f 12, pp. iii-iv, support do not express a clear and definite promise to convey 
title to the Property to CDLF. 
27. Within days of the closing on the Property, Mr. Bell began working on a draft lease 
agreement between Dream Chaser and CDLF and sent the draft lease agreement to Mr. Scott W. 
Hansen, counsel for CDLF. Affidavit of Jay B. Bell ("Bell Aff.") f l 4, 6. Counsel for both parties 
negotiated the lease agreement and traded numerous drafts back and forth. Bell Aff. f l 6-7,11 and 
Exs. 1-2. 
28. During the negotiations, Mr. Hansen proposed that the lease be simultaneously 
executed with a pledge of the Property to assure that CDLF would get title to the Property at some point 
in the future. Bell Aff. f 8 and Ex. L 
29. Mr. Hansen's proposal was rejected and Mr. Bell informed Mr. Hansen there was, 
and could be, no enforceable promise to contribute title to the Property. Bell Aff. f 9. Any such 
promise would have limited the Carters' charitable contribution for tax purposes. Id. Mr. Bell did not 
agree to have the Carters execute a pledge agreement of the Property. Bell Aff. f 10. No pledge of the 
Property was prepared by Mr. Bell or sent to Mr. Bell by Mr. Hansen. Id. 
30. On December 12,2000, the final version of the lease agreement was hand-delivered 
to Mr. Hansen for his client's signature. Bell Aff. f 12. It was subsequently returned to Mr. Bell, signed 
by Ms. Italiano-Thomas on behalf of CDLF and mailed to Bonnie Carter for her signature on December 
18,2000. Id. Bonnie Carter hand wrote in the definitive date, backdating the lease to October 1,2000, 
and signed it (the "Lease Agreement"). Carter Aff. f 30 and Ex. 1. 
31. On December 22, 2000, the Carters transferred their interest in Dream Chaser to the 
Foundation, a non-profit corporation formed by the Carters. Carter Aff. f 33 and Ex. 2. It was the 
transfer of this interest for which the Carters took a charitable deduction on their federal tax returns, not 
any transfer of any interest in the Property to CDLF or after improvements had been made. Carter Aff. 
134. This was how the Carters had planned to take the tax advantage of the charitable gift. Carter Aff. 
133. 
32. Sometime in October 2000, Bonnie Carter read an October 7,2000 Deseret News 
article regarding a Migrant Head Start center in Provo, operated by CDLF, being shut down. Carter Aff. 
f 37 and Ex. 4. The statement attributed to Ms. Italiano-Thomas in the article that "the Provo center was 
not offering the quality of care demanded of Head Start" and allegations that the operation provided 
poor care and served spoiled food caused Bonnie Carter a great deal of concern. It made her realize that 
anything could happen in the future and to be concerned about what would happen to the Property if 
CDLF could not operate the facility or became defunct in the future. Carter Aff. <f 37. 
33. The October 7, 2000 Deseret News article refers to a Provo Migrant Head Start 
center operated by CDLF being shut down. Carter Aff. Ex, 4. CDLF worked with licensed providers to 
find day care for the affected children and successfully accommodated a few children it at another 
facility it operated. Id. 
34. In addition, Bonnie Carter's continuing efforts to obtain marketable title to the 
South Parcel were proving fruitless. Carter Aff. f][ 28, 38. 
35. On March 23, 2001, Bonnie Carter wrote a letter to Ms. Italiano-Thomas stating 
that at the end of the two-year Lease Agreement, Dream Chaser intended to renew the Lease Agreement 
for a period of ten years and for subsequent periods of ten years in perpetuity until such time as the 
Lease Agreement was broken by CDLF or the Property was no longer needed by CDLF. Carter Aff. 
f 40 and Ex. 5. 
36. Ms. Italiano-Thomas received the March 23, 2001 letter, but did not act on it. 
Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 27. After consulting with counsel, CDLF rejected the terms of the 
March 23, 2001 letter. Id.; March 6, 2003 Affidavit of Scott W. Hansen f 11; Bell Aff. Ex. 3. See also 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support f 14, p. iv. The Carters never received any notice from CDLF that 
the offer in the March 23,2001 letter was unacceptable. Carter Aff. f 44. 
37. At the time the March 23, 2001 letter was sent, no renovation or construction had 
occurred at the Property and CDLF had not moved any of its operations or programs to the Property. 
Carter Aff. ff 41-43 and Ex. 6. At most, CDLF had paid $13,320 for architectural services. Second 
Italiano-Thomas Aff. % 20. 
38. Demolition, construction and remodeling work on the Property did not begin until 
late April or May 2001. Carter Affidavit f j 42,43 and Ex. 6. The improvements to the Property were 
necessary to bring it into compliance with Head Start Program guidelines. Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. 
ffl8,16-17. 
39. After receiving the March 23, 2001 letter, CDLF asserts that over the next fourteen 
months it spent $667,270.91 ($680,590.91 — $13,320) improving the Property. Second 
Italiano-Thomas Aff. H 20, 22 and Ex. G. 
40. CDLF began occupying the Property on June 1, 2002. First Italiano-Thomas Aff. 
f 6; Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. f 23. 
41. On May 31,2002, CDLF filed a Verified Complaint alternatively seeking damages 
and equitable restitution for breach of an alleged the oral contract to convey the Property to CDLF, 
unjust enrichment and fraud, as well as punitive damages. The Defendants filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim generally seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no agreement to convey, and a 
judgment rescinding the letter of March 23, 2001. On February 21, 2003, CDLF filed a Motion for 
Leave to File a First Amended Complaint, which asks for specific performance of the oral agreement to 
convey the Property, a declaration quieting title with respect to the right to ownership of the Property 
and, in particular, the right to enforce the agreement to convey the Property to CDLF and damages for 
unjust enrichment and fraud. The parties have stipulated to an Order Granting Leave to File First 
Amended Complaint with the jury trial demand stricken. 
42. CDLF's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that its Migrant Head Start 
services at the Property ended on March 21, 2003 and are not scheduled to resume until June 1, 2003. 
See also Frandsen Aff. Ex. 2. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e) sets forth the four elements required for a 
preliminary injunction to issue. Defendants only challenge CDLF's ability to satisfy the first and fourth 
elements: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction 
issues; 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits 
which should be the subject of further litigation. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(l) and (4). 
2. Because injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy," it "should not be lightly 
granted." Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,425 (Utah 1983). CDLF has the burden to 
establish that it has satisfied all four of the required elements. Water & Energy Sys. Tech. Inc. v. Keil, 
1999 UT 16, f 7, 974 P.2d 821, 822 (Utah 1999). 
3. Rule 65A(e)(4) requires, at a minimum, that CDLF make a prima facie showing 
"that the elements of its underlying claim can be proved." Water & Energy Sys.'Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 1999 
UT 16, f 8 (citations omitted). In its First Amended Complaint, CDLF has alleged four causes of action. 
In seeking a preliminary injunction, it relies only upon its claim for breach of an oral agreement to 
convey title to the Property to CDLF in exchange for substantial improvements CDLF made to 
rehabilitate the Property. 
4. The first element required to prove a prima facie case of breach of contract is the 
existence of a valid, enforceable contract. Under Utah law, there must be a meeting of the minds. 
Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). CDLF's reliance on the doctrine 
of part performance as either a means to avoid the statute of frauds or as a substitute for consideration, 
does not relieve CDLF of the requirement that it prove the existence of an agreement and the terms 
thereof. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) ("To meet the part performance exception to 
the statute of frauds [citation omitted] the terms of the oral contract must be clear and definite and 
established by clear and definite testimony."). 
5. Here, none of the facts relied on by CDLF demonstrate that the Carters ever 
expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged oral contract to convey title to the Property to 
CDLF. CDLF has no evidence that the offer was a firm commitment, as opposed to a mere agreement 
to agree. So called "agreements to agree" are generally unenforceable. Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 
P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979) (holding that statement of intent was not itself an enforceable contract 
because it only purported to be a letter indicating parties' intention to enter into binding agreement at 
later time); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (1961) (stating that "where there was simply some 
nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate 
the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it"). 
6. The Utah Statute of Frauds provides that "[e]very contract... for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is 
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2002). 
7. Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2002) provides that "[n]o estate or interest in 
real property . .. shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing." 
8. Pursuant to the Utah Statute of Frauds, CDLF's claim fails for two reasons: 1) the 
claimed contract is admittedly not in writing; and 2) none of the asserted "memorializations" of the 
agreement are "subscribed by" Bonnie Carter or any authorized agent for Dream Chaser or the 
Foundation. Thus, none of the "memorializations" relied upon by CDLF satisfy the statute of frauds. 
See Baugh v. City of Logan, 495 P.2d 814 (Utah 1972) (holding that meeting minutes did not satisfy the 
statute of frauds because there was nothing to indicate that they had been subscribed to by the party by 
whom the sale was to be made). 
9. Because CDLF admits the agreement to convey was not in writing subscribed by 
Carter, an exception to the Statute of Frauds is relied upon to establish the likelihood that CDLF will 
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim. Specifically, CDLF asserts that the oral agreement to 
convey is excepted from the Statute of Frauds by the doctrine of part performance. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-8. 
10. The evidentiary burden is on CDLF to "establish the contract by clear, convincing, 
and definite evidence and to show that the acts of part performance done pursuant to the contract were 
also clear, definite and referable exclusively to the contract." Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980) 
(citing Holmgren Bros, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (1975)). See also Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 
(Utah 1983) ("it must be proved by strong evidence"); Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570, 579 (Utah 
1953); Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 770 (1906). 
11. CDLF argues that the expenditure of approximately $681,000 to renovate the 
Property constituted part performance of an alleged oral agreement to convey the Property to CDLF. 
12. The act of renovating the Property, however, was not clearly and definitely 
referable exclusively to the alleged oral agreement. There was no renovation of the Property before the 
March 23, 2001 letter offered that at the end of the Lease Agreement Dream Chaser would renew the 
Lease Agreement for periods of ten years until the Lease Agreement was broken by CDLF or the 
Property was no longer needed by CDLF. Carter Aff. Ex. 5. This promise was made over a month 
before CDLF began renovating the Property. See Carter Aff. f 43 and Ex. 6. The renovation of the 
Property, then, can easily be viewed as evidencing CDLFs intention to be subject to the offered long-
term lease. 
13. CDLF's claimed part performance of the oral agreement can also be explained by 
referring to the underlying Lease Agreement. The Lease Agreement allowed CDLF "at its own cost and 
expense" to "make such alteration in the building as [CDLF] may require for the conduct of its 
business." Carter Aff. Ex. 116. The improvements to the Property were necessary to bring it into 
compliance with Head Start Program guidelines. Second Italiano-Thomas Aff. ff 8,16-17. 
14. That same section of the Lease Agreement further provided: 
Any alterations or improvements to the Premises shall become the 
property of the Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination of this 
Lease, except as herein otherwise provided. 
Id. See also id. f 17 ("Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up . . . all of Tenant's improvements and 
alterations, at the expiration, or sooner termination, of this Lease"). Thus, the Lease Agreement 
allocated the risk to CDLF that any renovations it made would benefit Dream Chaser, the owner, upon 
expiration or termination of the Lease Agreement. 
15. In Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981), the court held that plaintiffs 
possession of the home which defendant orally promised to convey to him coupled with improvements 
thereto did not constitute part performance where "plaintiffs possession of the property was not 
exclusively referable to a contract of purchase, but was equally consonant with defendant's allegation of 
a rental agreement." 624 P.2d at 715. See also Lloyd v. Price, 86 P. 770 (holding that plaintiffs 
possession of property and making of improvements could reasonably be explained as merely for the 
comfort and convenience of a tenant-at-will). 
16. Promissory estoppel is recognized as an exception to the statute of frauds only 
"when a misrepresentation as to the future operates as an abandonment of an existing right of the party 
making the misrepresentation, i.e., the promise as to future conduct must constitute a manifestation that 
the promissor will abandon an existing right which he possesses." McKinnon v. Corp. of the Pres. of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1974). This narrow application of 
the doctrine evidences the court's position that "[j]ust as the statute of frauds should not be used to 
perpetrate fraud, so, too, promissory estoppel should not be allowed to eviscerate the statute of frauds. 
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
17. Any attempt by CDLF to argue promissory estoppel must fail because any oral 
promise by Bonnie Carter to transfer title to the Property to CDLF did not constitute a manifestation by 
Carter to abandon an existing right which she possessed. In fact, all but one of the factual predicates for 
CDLF's allegation Bonnie Carter expressed an intent to convey title to the Property to CDLF, occurred 
prior to the Property being transferred to Bonnie Carter/Dream Chaser. Because ownership of the 
Property was not "an existing right" of Bonnie Carter or Dream Chaser, Bonnie Carter's statements of 
intent to transfer title of the Property to CDLF could not constitute an exception to the statutes of fraud. 
See Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 578 (holding that defendant was not barred from using the statute of frauds as 
a defense, despite his earlier promises that he would transfer property to the plaintiff, because in making 
these promises he did not express the intent to abandon an existing right). 
18. In Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., the court held that the defendant was not 
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds where at no time did its conduct "clearly manifest an 
intention that [it would] not assert the statute [of frauds]." Stangl, 948 P.2d at 365. See McKinnon, 529 
P.2d at 437 (holding same)). 
19. Similar to the defendants in Stangl and McKinnon, here the Defendants' conduct 
did not clearly manifest an intention to give up an existing right to the statute of frauds defense. Just the 
opposite, the Defendants' formal written execution of a Lease Agreement with CDLF in December of 
2000 and the March 23, 2001 letter sent to CDLF evidence an intent to protect the right to the protection 
of the statute of frauds. 
20. Even if Defendants' conduct manifested an intent to give up an existing right, they 
should not be estopped from claiming the statute of frauds as a defense because CDLF's reliance on 
Bonnie Carter's representations that title to the Property would be transferred to CDLF was not 
reasonable. In order to establish "promissory estoppel," a plaintiff must act with prudence and in 
"reasonable reliance on a promise made by the defendant." Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 
989 P.2d 1077,1088 (Utah 1999) (citation omitted). Because CDLF did not begin renovating the 
Property until well after Bonnie Carter sent the March 23, 2001 letter to CDLF, CDLF cannot establish 
reasonable reliance. "The alleged promise must be reasonably certain and definite" Id. (citations 
omitted). After the March 23, 2001 letter was sent, Bonnie Carter's prior statements as to an intent to 
transfer title to the Property to CDLF, were far from "certain" or "definite." CDLF's reliance, therefore, 
is unreasonable as a matter of law and cannot support a claim for promissory estoppel. 
21. CDLF's own testimony brings into question whether there was any forbearance in 
June 2000 based on CDLF's assertion it withdrew from attempting to locate some other property, or to 
purchase the Property using money it allegedly had on hand. First Italiano-Thomas Aff.") f 5 ("it was 
unlikely we would be able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property"). 
22. Here, CDLF's right to relief is not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to warrant this 
Court granting the requested preliminary injunction. CDLF has not established that there is a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits of its breach of contract claim. 
23. The allegation that underlies CDLF's claim that it has met the requirement of 
irreparable harm depends on the speculative fear that the Migrant Head Start program operated on the 
Property could not relocate to another facility and would have to close. Such speculative assertions of 
harm are inadequate. System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). 
24. CDLF's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that its Migrant Head Start 
services at the Property ended on March 21, 2003 and are not scheduled to resume until June 1, 2003. 
25. Finally, the evidence indicates that CDLF has shut down other facilities and 
worked with licensed providers to find day care for the affected children and successfully 
accommodated a few children at another facility it operated. Carter Aff. Ex. 4. 
26. There is not sufficient evidence to establish that there was an agreement reached 
between counsel for the parties to allow CDLF to occupy the Property during the pendency of litigation. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Motion to Enforce Stipulation are denied. 
DATED this day of May, 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
J. Dennis Frederick 
Third District Court Judge 
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